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The Law of the Test: Performance-Based
Regulation and Diesel Emissions Control
Cary Coglianeset and Jennifer Nash*
The Volkswagen diesel emissions scandal of 2015 not only pushed that
company's stock and retail sales into freefall, but also raised serious questions
about the efficacy of existing regulatory controls. The same furtive actions
taken by Volkswagen had been taken nearly twenty years earlier by other firms
in the diesel industry. In that previous scandal, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) discovered that diesel truck engine manufacturers
had, like Volkswagen would later do, programmed on-board computers to
calibrate their engines one way to satisfy the required emissions test but then to
re-calibrate automatically to achieve better fuel economy and responsiveness
when the trucks were on the road, even though doing so increased emissions
above the mandated level. This Article provides an in-depth retrospective study
of the federal government's efforts to regulate diesel emissions. In particular, it
chronicles the earlier saga over heavy-duty diesel truck engines to reveal
important lessons for regulators who use a regulatory strategy known as
performance-based regulation. Endorsed around the world and used in many
settings, performance-based regulation mandates the attainment of outcomes-
the passing of a test-but leaves the means for doing so up to the regulated
entities. In theory, performance standards are highly appealing, but their
actual performance in practice has remained virtually unstudied by scholars of
regulation. This Article's extensive analysis of U.S. diesel emissions control
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provides a new basis to learn how performance-based regulation works in
action, revealing some of its previously unacknowledged limitations. Precisely
because performance-based regulation offers flexibility, it facilitates, if not
invites, private-sector firms to innovate in ways that allow them to pass
mandated tests while confounding regulators' broader policy objectives. When
regulating the diesel industry or any other aspect of the economy, policymakers
should temper their enthusiasm for performance standards and, when they use
them, maintain constant vigilance for private-sector tactics that run counter to
proper regulatory goals.
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"[N]o test can cover everything."*
Introduction
When Martin Winterkorn, the chief executive officer of Volkswagen,
announced to the world in the fall of 2015 that he was "deeply sorry" for
having "broken the trust" of the public, he cast more than just his company's
* Motor Vehicle Certification Procedures, 39 Fed. Reg. 7545, 7548 (Feb. 27, 1974).
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leadership into question.' The deception his company perpetrated over
emissions from millions of its diesel cars also revealed a striking failure of
governmental regulatory leadership.2 For the preceding seven years, the world's
largest automaker had sold cars with emissions control systems that satisfied
regulators' mandatory emissions tests when connected to laboratory devices but
that emitted up to forty times more pollutants than allowed by law when driven
on the road.3 To uncover this deception, it took only the initiative of a relatively
tiny non-governmental organization and a handful of university researchers
testing just three cars' emissions on the road. These relatively simple actions
ultimately revealed a massive corporate and regulatory failure that has led to
Winterkorn's resignation,4 the plummeting of Volkswagen's stock value and
market sales,5 hundreds of lawsuits by consumers claiming the company
defrauded them,6 and federal and state lawsuits involving tens of billions of
dollars in penalties for regulatory violations.7
1. Press Release, Volkswagen, Statement of Prof. Dr. Martin Winterkorn, CEO of
Volkswagen AG (Sept. 20, 2015), http://media.vw.com/release/1066/.
2. See Virginia Harrison, Move Over Toyota! Volkswagen Winning Global Sales Race,
CNN MONEY (July 28, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/28/investing/volkswagen-toyota-biggest-
carmaker/; Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772.
3. See, e.g., Notice of Violation, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Sept. 18, 2015),
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/20 15-1 0/documents/vw-nov-caa-09- 1 8-15 .pdf; Learn About
Volkswagen Violations, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Jan. 12, 2016),
http://www.epa.gov/vw/learn-about-volkswagen-violations.
4. See Jack Ewing, Volkswagen C.E.O. Martin Winterkorn Resigns Amid Emissions
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/24/business/international/
volkswagen-chief-martin-winterkorn-resigns-amid-emissions-scandal.html.
5. See, e.g., Alex Davies, Volkswagen's US Sales Plummet 25 Percent as Dieselgate
Rolls on, WIRED (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/12/volkswagen-us-sales-plummet-25-as-
dieselgate-rolls-on/; Benjamin Snyder & Stacy Jones, Here's a Timeline of Volkswagen's Tanking Stock
Price, FORTUNE (Sept. 23, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/23/volkswagen-stock-drop.
6. See Sara Randazzo, U.S. Suits over Volkswagen Emissions To Be Weighed in San
Francisco, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-suits-over-volkswagen-
emissions-to-be-weighed-in-san-francisco- 1449612934.
7. See, e.g., Julia Edwards & Georgina Prodhan, VW Faces Billions in Fines as U.S.
Sues for Environmental Violations, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
volkswagen-usa-idUSKBNOUI1QP20160106; Jack Ewing & Hiroko Tabuchi, Volkswagen Scandal
Reaches All the Way to the Top, Lawsuits Say, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/20 16/07/20f/business/international/volkswagen-ny-attorney-general-emissions-
scandal.html; Volkswagen To Spend up to $14.7 Billion To Settle Allegations of Cheating Emissions
Tests and Deceiving Customers on 2.0 Liter Diesel Vehicles, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (June 28, 2016)
[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T JUST.], https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/volkswagen-spend-147-billion-settle-
allegations-cheating-emissions-tests-and-deceiving. On October 26, 2016, U.S. District Judge Charles
Breyer approved the $14.7 billion settlement between federal and California regulators and vehicle
owners. See David Shepardson, U.S. Judge Approves $14.7 Billion Settlement in VW Diesel Scandal,
REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-volkswagen-emissions-idUSKCN12P22F.
The settlement does not resolve potential criminal liability for corporate officers, and senior
management reportedly remain under investigation in the United States and Europe. Jack Ewing,
Volkswagen Emissions Scandal Inquiry Widens to Top Levels, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/business/inquiry-in-emissions-scandal-widens-to-volkswagens-
top-levels.html.
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Yet the Volkswagen scandal was hardly unforeseeable. To the contrary, it
actually confirmed the aphorism that failure to learn from the past makes one
destined to repeat it.8 Nearly twenty years earlier, the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) had by happenstance uncovered a remarkably similar
set of industry tactics deployed by the manufacturers of diesel truck engines.
The engines at that time also satisfied required regulatory tests when connected
to laboratory equipment, but once trucks with these engines operated for an
extended time on the open road, the engines' on-board computers re-calibrated
engine performance to optimize for overall responsiveness and fuel economy,
not for emissions control. As a result, in just a single year, noncompliant diesel
truck engines reportedly spewed more than a million excess tons of nitrogen
oxides (NOx)-a key chemical in the creation of harmful ozone pollution and
the principal pollutant released in excess by Volkswagen's tampered cars.9
According to a congressional report on this earlier emissions debacle, the diesel
truck emissions that escaped regulatory control roughly equated to the volume
of pollution that would have been produced by adding 65 million more cars per
year to the nation's roads-and ultimately these excessive emissions may have
even contributed to more than 4,100 premature fatalities from compromised air
quality .'o
Although the earlier debacle over diesel truck engines resulted in what
was at the time the largest enforcement fine that the EPA ever imposed, the
agency nevertheless failed to learn adequately from its experience in the 1990s
and thus failed to detect the more recent Volkswagen deception. Part of the
reason for this failure may well lie with an increasingly recognized lack of
sufficient retrospective analysis in the regulatory process." Part of the
explanation also likely derives from an overconfidence that regulators around
the world have placed in so-called performance-based regulation-or what we
call here "the law of the test."
8. See George Santayana, Reason in Common Sense, in I THE LIFE OF REASON 284
(1905).
9. See infra notes 46, 153 and accompanying text.
10. See Asleep at the Wheel: The Environmental Protection Agency's Failure To
Enforce Pollution Standards for Heavy-Duty Diesel Trucks, STAFF H. COMM. ON COM. (Mar. 2000).
11. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Lori D. Snyder Bennear, Program Evaluation of
Environmental Policies: Toward Evidence-Based Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 246 (Garry D. Brewer &
Paul C. Stem eds., 2005); Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory
Experimentation and Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION I Il (David Moss & John
Cisternino eds., 2009); Cary Coglianese, Measuring Regulatory Performance: Evaluating the Impact of
Regulation and Regulatory Policy, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Aug. 2012),
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/1-coglianese%20web.pdf; Reeve T. Bull, Building a
Framework for Governance: Retrospective Review and Rulemaking Petitions, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 265
(2015); Joseph E. Aldy, Report to the Administrative Conference of the U.S., Learning from
Experience: An Assessment of the Retrospective Reviews of Agency Rules and the Evidence for




The Law of the Test
Although all regulation is broadly "performance-based" in the sense of
aiming to affect the performance of regulated entities, the regulations at the
heart of both the diesel truck and Volkswagen scandals obligated manufacturers
to achieve a specified outcome-that is, to pass an emissions test-while
leaving it to each company's discretion to determine how to attain that required
outcome.12 The flexibility of such a performance-based approach gives
regulated entities the ability to choose the least costly means of achieving the
stated outcome, thus making these standards more cost-effective than ones that
tell regulated entities exactly what they must do or what technologies to adopt.
But performance standards can be effective only when the outcomes they
achieve are similar to the outcomes they mandate. If regulators are not careful
and vigilant, the flexibility that performance standards afford regulated entities
may lead to outcomes that, as with both diesel emissions sagas, escape
adequate regulatory attention and prove to be much less effective than intended.
The history of failure in overseeing diesel emissions control offers vital
lessons not only for improving air pollution regulation but also for improving
regulation more generally. In this Article, we look back on this history of diesel
emissions control with an eye toward drawing out these important policy
lessons. Against the seemingly universal acclaim offered for performance-
based regulation, EPA's experience with diesel emissions regulation reveals a
series of pitfalls and limitations in the use of performance standards that have
previously gone unacknowledged. Performance standards can foster a
"teaching-to-the-test" mindset on the part of regulated entities that can result in
perverse, unintended outcomes. As regulators respond to such outcomes by
making testing more complex, performance standards can increase, rather than
decrease, regulatory burdens. They can even at times limit flexibility in
practice, notwithstanding that performance standards' chief virtue lies in their
flexibility. They certainly offer no guarantee against the emergence of conflict
and litigation in the regulatory process, either. These and other limitations that
emerge from our close inquiry into diesel emissions control make plain that
performance standards are no panacea and that designing and implementing
them well requires considerable care and vigilance.
Part I sets the stage for our study. It describes the performance-based
regulatory paradigm, its chief characteristics, and its theoretical advantages. We
also explain why this retrospective study of a major performance-based
regulatory regime is so vital. The basic law-of-the-test approach we study here
has been almost uniformly lauded and yet has so seldom been subjected itself
to retrospective testing.'
3
12. We use the term "standard" throughout this Article interchangeably with "rule"
and "regulation." Furthermore, when we say that a performance standard imposes an obligation to
achieve an outcome, this can mean either delivering a good outcome (e.g., passing a test of strength) or
avoiding a bad outcome (e.g., not failing a test of weakness). Section IA, infra, provides more
developed definitional and conceptual overview of the law of the test.
13. See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
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In Part II, we proceed to our study of diesel emissions control. To provide
a technical basis for understanding how diesel emissions tests have failed, we
begin by explaining how the diesel engine contributes to air pollution problems
in the United States and by reviewing the main ways air pollution from diesel
engines can be reduced, from engine controls to fuels to tailpipe capture
devices. We then chronicle the federal policies that have sought to reduce
diesel emissions, principally focusing our attention on regulations addressing
NOx emissions from heavy-duty diesel truck engines. These regulations have
been performance-based for some time now, and the experience that the EPA
has had in developing and enforcing these standards affords us the opportunity
to assess the promise and the pitfalls of performance-based regulation in
practice. We detail both the regulations leading up to the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments, as well as the performance-based NOx standards and testing
protocols that the EPA put in place after the pivotal 1990 legislative changes.
In Part III, we pay particular attention to the litigation that ensued in the
mid-1990s over the way that manufacturers of diesel truck engines had chosen
to comply with the EPA's NOx regulations. Although manufacturers built
engines that passed the EPA's tests, they did so using controls that the EPA
claimed circumvented the spirit of the standards and that, in use on the roads,
emitted substantial levels of NOx vastly exceeding those contemplated by the
regulators. We also discuss what happened after the EPA and the engine
manufacturers settled their lawsuit, including showing how the agency's testing
protocols have grown ever more complex-even while the same law-of-the-test
strategy failed to detect the latest deception by Volkswagen.
In Part IV, we conclude by considering the implications that the
experience with diesel emissions regulation holds for understanding the value
and limitations of performance-based regulation more broadly. Especially
given the paucity of research on how performance standards have operated in
practice, this close examination of the EPA's diesel emissions regulatory
scheme provide valuable lessons for regulators about what is realistic to expect
from the reliance on performance-based approaches to regulation. Although we
do not deny that the flexibility that performance standards promise can in
principle deliver more cost-effective outcomes, we also show how that same
flexibility can also lead to, if not even invite, creative responses by regulated
entities that may meet the letter of the law but fail the purpose of the test. In
contrast with the prevailing unbridled enthusiasm for performance-based
regulation that seems to prevail among scholars and policy officials, this
retrospective study of the law of the test in the realm of environmental
regulation raises important questions and cautionary lessons for the use of
performance standards across all regulatory domains.
Vol. 34, 2017
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I. The Performance-Based Regulatory Paradigm
Rarely, if ever, does the label "command-and-control" get used
approvingly to describe regulation.14 No doubt this is because regulation is
frequently derided for being too inflexible. Especially when government
mandates that each and every regulated firm undertake identical action,
regulation is deplored for its "one-size-fits-all" orientation that generates costly,
if not at times counterproductive, results.
15
As a result, if the problem with much of regulation lies with its rigidity,
the solution presumably should rest with making it more flexible. The most
widely affirmed way of making regulation flexible is for government to
establish mandatory goals for everyone to achieve, or at least outcomes to
avoid, while leaving it up to businesses to figure out how they can meet the
required performance target.16 This performance-based approach to regulation
has won, and continues to win, praise from policy leaders around the world and
across the political spectrum.7
President William Clinton, for example, urged his regulatory agencies to
"specify performance objectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner
of compliance that regulated entities must adopt."'8 President George W.
Bush's regulatory team followed by advising agencies that performance
standards are "generally superior to engineering or design standards because
performance standards give the regulated parties the flexibility to achieve
regulatory objectives in the most cost-effective way." 9 President Barack
Obama directed his administration to give preference to "[fWlexible
,,20
[a]pproaches," including the use of "performance objectives.
Regulators and policy professionals working across a wide variety of
policy areas-from banking to building codes, and from natural resources to
nuclear power-offer widespread acclaim for the value of performance-based
standards. Such nearly universal affirmation should hardly be surprising. The
14. "Command-and-control" is "almost always used to distinguish the writer's (or
speaker's) own preferred approach from disparaged alternatives." Cary Coglianese, Debate:
Collaborative Environmental Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289, 308 (2007).
15. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982); PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON
SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994).
16. See, e.g., DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 199
(2006) ("In general, government should focus on setting demanding goals and leave firms more
discretion in deciding how to meet them.").
17. See Cary Coglianese, Performance-Based Regulation: Concepts and Challenges,
in COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION: UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL REGULATORY PROCESS 403,
404 (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds., 2016) (noting that "[elnthusiasm for performance-based
regulation extends far outside the United States" and giving examples from Canada, Mexico, the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Trade Organization).
18. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,736 (Oct. 4, 1993).
19. Off. of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Circular A-4: Regulatory Analysis (Sept. 17,
2003) [hereinafter OIRA], http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda/m03-2 I.html.
20. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821,3821-22 (Jan. 18,2011).
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label "performance-based" is itself appealing; surely everyone would like
regulation to perform well, which is what monikers like "performance
standards" and "performance-based regulation" seem to imply.21 Moreover, the
flexibility afforded by performance standards undoubtedly appeals to all lovers
of liberty. Legal scholar and former White House regulatory official Cass
Sunstein, for example, has argued that a regulatory strategy that relies on
"flexible 'performance standards' . . . reduces costs [and] promotes freedom.22
In a world in which so-called command-and-control regulation is so widely
deplored, any type of regulation that is seen (even if oxymoronically) to
"promote freedom" is destined to win over many hearts and minds.23
Despite the lavish praise heaped on performance-based regulation,
strikingly little empirical research has been produced to show how performance
standards work in practice and how they compare with other types of
regulation .24 The usual reasons offered for preferring performance standards are
axiomatic: namely, if government specifies the ends it seeks, then firms will
necessarily be free to select the most effective or least costly options to achieve
those ends. It is as nearly axiomatic that businesses will have better information
than government will about the options that will work best for them.
2
1
Yet as compelling as these theoretical reasons for performance-based
regulation may be, practice does not always live up to theory-or at least it
sometimes can reveal other considerations that theory overlooks. To begin to
build a stronger base of knowledge about performance standards in practice, we
will trace in Parts II and III of this Article the development and implementation
of a key example of performance-based regulation: the EPA's control of
emissions from heavy-duty diesel engines. The EPA has addressed this source
of air pollution by issuing performance standards, setting emissions levels, and
establishing testing protocols, but otherwise leaving it up to diesel engine
manufacturers to determine how to meet the required tests. As we seek to draw
potentially generalizable insights about regulation from the EPA's experience
regulating diesel emissions, it is first necessary to situate performance
21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Of course, sharp differences of opinion
prevail about what constitutes good performance.
22. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT 11 -12 (2013).
23. In this sense, performance-based regulation can be likened to "those wise
restraints that make men free," a well-known quotation attributed to law professor John MacArthur
Maquire and enshrined on a plaque found in the Harvard Law School library.
24. See Cary Coglianese, Jennifer Nash & Todd Olmstead, Performance-Based
Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety, and Environmental Protection, 55 ADMIN. L.
REV. 705, 708, 713 (2003) (noting the "dearth of empirical studies aimed at measuring the effectiveness
of performance-based standards" and how "researchers have yet to subject performance-based standards
to close empirical scrutiny"). One exception can be found in some empirical research on performance-
based building code regulation in New Zealand, which reportedly contributed to a major economic crisis
in that small country. See, e.g., PETER MUMFORD, ENHANCING PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION:
LESSONS FROM NEW ZEALAND'S BUILDING CONTROL SYSTEM (2011); Peter May, Performance-Based
Regulation and Regulatory Regimes: The Saga of Leaky Buildings, 25 LAW & POL'Y 381 (2003).
25. See Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for
Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277 (2004).
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standards-or what we call the law-of-the-test approach to regulation-within
the larger context of a regulator's overall toolkit.
A. Types of Regulatory Standards
Although regulatory scholars have tended simply to assume that
performance standards are superior to other types of regulatory instruments, the
design of regulatory standards has not entirely escaped serious analysis. On the
contrary, an expansive body of literature on regulatory instrument choice
26 texists. However, this literature gives vastly more attention to other types of
regulatory instruments, such as information-disclosure regulation27 or market-
based mechanisms like emissions trading,28 than to simple performance
standards.
This literature on regulatory instrument design is also limited in that it
lacks a single, well-accepted taxonomy of different types of regulatory
standards. Scholar Kenneth Richards, for example, has compiled over a dozen
competing schema for categorizing regulatory instruments from existing
literature .29 Thus, terminology varies across different schema of regulatory
instruments, and even what different people mean by a term as seemingly
straightforward as "performance-based regulation" can differ.30 Despite the
existence of varying schema and associated terminology, the concepts
underlying these schema do bear sufficient similarity so that the main types of
instruments can be much more clearly classified than they have tended to be to
date. To begin with, by "regulatory instrument," we mean (i) a rule or standard
(a conditional or normative statement) (ii) backed up with consequences and
(iii) issued in order to induce a desired change in behavior (iv) that in turn will
lead to some improved state of the world.
26. For a survey and discussion of the literature on regulatory instrument choice, see
Kenneth Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
221 (2000). See also Cary Coglianese, Listening, Learning, and Leading: A Framework for Regulatory
Excellence, PENN PROGRAM ON REG. 46-49 (2015), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/4946-
pprfinalconvenersreportpdf.
27. See, e.g., ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WELL, FULL DISCLOSURE:
THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007); JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH
REVELATION: THE ORIGIN, POLITICS, AND IMPACTS OF THE ToxiCs RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM
(2005); Carol Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance
of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 295 (1989).
28. See, e.g., JODY FREEMAN & CHARLES D. KOLSTAD, MOVING TO MARKETS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE (2006); Robert N.
Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from S02 Allowance Trading,
12 J. ECON. PERSP. 69 (1998).
29. See Richards, supra note 26, at 284-85. He notes that "the plurality of instruments
and combinations thereof.., have steadfastly defied economists' and policy analysts' prescriptions." Id.
at 223.
30. For example, sometimes regulators have used "performance-based regulation" to
refer to what I have called management standards, even though most policy analysts and scholars use it,
as we do here, to refer to performance standards. See Coglianese, supra note 17, at 409.
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For purposes of analytical clarity, we recognize that all regulatory
instruments possess the following four characteristics:3"
* The Regulator. Who is issuing the command?
* The Target. To whom (or toward what entity) is the command
directed?
* The Command. What is the regulator telling the target to do or
achieve (or not to do or not achieve)?
* The Consequences. What will happen to the target if the
command is or is not followed?
The regulator is often a governmental entity, but for some purposes it
could also be a trade association, insurance company, or other non-
governmental entity. Targets can be individual actors, products, or discharge
points, or they can be entire industrial facilities, corporations, or perhaps even
sectors. In the diesel engine sagas, the EPA acts as the regulator and diesel
engine manufacturers act as the targets.
What a regulator expects of targets can vary, but to generalize, the
regulator's command can take one of three forms:
32
* Means standards. A command can direct a target how to act (e.g.,
"install a scrubber on a smokestack"). It can specify steps to take,
behaviors to adopt, or technologies to use. We call such
commands means standards,33 as they direct regulated targets to
adopt some specified means of achieving the desired ends.
* Performance standards. Alternatively, a command can direct a
target what to achieve but leave it up to the target to select the
means (e.g., "do not allow emissions from smokestack to exceed
X level"). As already noted, such a command specifies the ends
rather than the means and is called a performance standard.
* Management standards. In some cases, regulators condition
consequences neither on the adoption of particular means nor on
the attainment (or avoidance) of particular ends, but instead direct
targets to think or to plan (e.g., "develop a plan that is designed to
reduce emissions from smokestacks"). When regulation
conditions consequences on planning or related management
31. See Cary Coglianese, Engaging Business in the Regulation of Nanotechnology, in
GOVERNING UNCERTAINTY: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN THE AGE OF NANOTECHNOLOGY 46
(Christopher J. Bosso ed., 2010).
32. For related discussions, see Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based
Regulation: Prescribing Private Management To Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC. REV. 691
(2003); and Coglianese et al, supra note 24.
33. Other terms for this regulatory approach include specification or design standards
or technology-based standards.
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activities, rather than on desired ends or actions directly linked to
those ends, we call these management standards.34
Of course, many other terms have been used to describe specific operative rules
that fall into each of these categories. The labels are not so critical; the key
takeaway is to recognize the core conceptual underpinnings of these three
different categories of commands .3
As these are different types of commands, the differences between them
hold regardless of who the regulator or target may be. They also hold regardless
of what the consequences associated with a regulatory instrument might be.
Some consequences may be positive ones, such as when a regulator gives
targets that adhere to the command a reward, subsidy, or exemption. More
commonly, consequences will be negative, as when targets are subject to
penalties or the shutdown of business operations.36
As noted, the distinction between regulating means and ends is often
thought to relate to the amount of discretion afforded regulated targets. That is,
by using performance standards-or regulating through ends-the target is
assumed to have greater discretion. But such a relationship is not always clear.
Although performance-based regulations give targets flexibility with respect to
how they go about meeting the stated ends, they are usually not flexible about
what specific performance the targets must achieve-or by when. In other
words, flexibility with means is not the same thing as flexibility with ends.
Moreover, in some cases, the specified level of performance can only be
achieved through a single, known technology or action-meaning that targets
in such cases will have no greater degree of flexibility (at least in the short
term) than if that means had been mandated.37
The degree of flexibility embodied in performance standards can also vary
depending on whether the targets are commanded to achieve the ultimate goal
of the regulation, or instead to achieve some end-state that is subsidiary to the
ultimate goal. As a general matter, a performance standard that articulates its
34. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 32. As noted, sometimes regulators have used
"performance-based regulation" to refer to management standards. See supra note 30.
35. Some might say our three distinctions fail to capture other important regulatory
instruments, such as emissions permit trading or information disclosure. We believe all these alternative
regulatory instruments are encompassed in the "trichotomy" we have presented. Emissions trading, after
all, is a type of performance-based regulation -except not every target has to meet the same emissions
level. And information disclosure can be variously a means to an end (e.g., lessening fraud) or an end
itself (e.g., informed consumers). For further discussion, see Coglianese, supra note 17, at 408-10.
36. These consequences can also be imposed in different increments. Often regulators
impose a fixed fine regardless of whether a target exceeds a standard by a little or a lot. But certain kinds
of market-based instruments, such as emissions taxes, impose incremental or marginal "fines" that
accumulate with the level of undesirable outcomes, such as pollution.
37. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982); Off. of
Tech. Assessment, Environmental Policy Tools: A User's Guide, U.S. CONG. (Sept. 1995),
https://www.princeton.edu/-ota/diskl/1995/9517/9517.PDF. In some cases, although regulations take
the form of performance standards, they may be based explicitly on what only one available technology
can achieve. See Off. of Tech. Assessment, supra.
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command in terms of achieving the ultimate societal objective, such as
preventing illness, will afford regulated targets considerably greater discretion
in choosing how to meet that overarching goal than will a regulation that
addresses the same goal by commanding regulated entities to achieve narrower,
subsidiary outputs, such as reducing NOx emissions to below a stated level.
The degree of discretion that government should afford regulated industry
is central to a persistent debate over the role of means standards in
environmental law and other areas of regulatory policy. On one side are those
who criticize means standards for treating every firm the same, regardless of
their costs of pollution control. One concern is that one-size-fits-all means
standards provide no incentive for firms to develop new technologies, while
another concern is that means standards demand intensive information-
gathering by government on "complex scientific, engineering, and economic
issues regarding the feasibility of controls on hundreds of thousands of
pollution sources."38 On the other side of this debate are those who defend
means standards as easier to develop and implement, since all government
needs to do is identify existing technologies that work and impose requirements
that firms adopt them.39 It may also be far easier to inspect facilities'
compliance with means standards, as an inspector may only need to see if the
required technology is installed rather than measure the actual outputs of, say,
individual smokestacks and discharge points.
Although we have no illusion that this debate can be settled by a single
study of an important performance-based regulation, this Article aims to
illuminate this debate by contributing to a clearer understanding of how
different regulatory instruments have worked in practice.4° Our focus is on
assessing one major, but largely unexamined, type of regulation: performance
standards.
B. Assessing Performance: The Law of the Test
In order to enforce performance standards, regulators need some way to
determine whether regulated targets have met the applicable outcomes. For
performance standards, then, the available methods of observation, testing,
measurement, and monitoring merit attention as much as the operative
performance-based command itself. This is because, in practice, the way the
regulator decides to assess performance becomes part of what any performance
standard entails-even if the operative terms of a standard do not refer to
assessment methods at all.
38. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN.L.REV. 1333, 1335-36 (1985).
39. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 94-103.
40. See Lori S. Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Measuring Progress: Program
Evaluation of Environmental Policies, 47 ENV'T: SCI. & POL'Y FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 22 (2005).
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Methods of assessment can include: (1) direct, in-use measurement of
actual outputs, whether continuously or at intervals; (2) testing under
conditions thought to mirror real-world conditions; and (3) simulations
analyzed using mathematical models of relationships among inputs, outputs,
and various operational constraints. An example of direct, in-use measurement
would be a continuous emissions monitoring device that collects and measures
the level of pollutants that are being released from emissions sources during
everyday operations. When direct, in-use measurement is not feasible,
regulators can develop tests designed to mirror real-world conditions, and then
measure the outputs of those tests. Compliance with automobile safety rules,
for example, is determined by manufacturers conducting crash tests with
dummies.4' When performance cannot be measured under real or even testing
conditions, it must be estimated using simulations. To determine whether
buildings meet performance-based fire safety codes, for instance, regulators
obviously do not burn down the very buildings being regulated to see how
resistant they are.42 Regulators increasingly turn to computer models of
building construction and the behavior of fires to assess compliance with
performance-based fire safety and building codes.4 For some environmental
problems, regulators may be able to draw inferences about outputs by
measuring inputs, such as when levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from
emissions sources are estimated simply by determining the amount of carbon
contained in the fuel being burned."
These methods of assessment matter not only for regulators, but also for
researchers and evaluators of performance standards. After all, the extent to
which a performance standard works effectively will be a function, at least in
part, of how accurately and comprehensively the regulator is able to monitor
the performance of regulated entities. A faulty thermometer, after all, will not
detect temperatures at which food in a refrigerator will spoil. If a regulator's
methods imperfectly determine whether firms are meeting the commanded
outcomes, the actual outcomes of the firms' operations could very well satisfy
the regulator's test, but still fail to achieve the outcomes directed in the
regulation itself, or fail to address the problem motivating the regulation.
41. See, e.g., JOHN GRAHAM, AUTO SAFETY: ASSESSING AMERICA'S PERFORMANCE
71, 117 (1989).
42. Of course, they do test individual components by burning them in tests, and on
occasion researchers may bum test models.
43. See Kathy Notarianni & Paul S. Fischbeck, Performance with Uncertainty: A
Process for Implementing Performance-Based Fire Regulations, in IMPROVING REGULATION: CASES IN
ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND SAFETY 233-34 (Paul S. Fischbeck & R. Scott Forrow eds., 2001).
44. The EPA refers to this as the "mass balance approach." U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Recommended Procedures for Development of Emissions Factors and Use of the WebFIRE Database 2-
2 to 2-3 (2013), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/chief/efpac/procedures/procedures8l2l3.pdf ( escribing the
use of fuel inputs in estimating emissions outputs and noting that "[flor certain processes, a mass
balance provides an easier and less expensive estimate of emissions than would be obtained by direct
measurement").
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From an evaluation standpoint, performance standards can be said to have
an impact when they generate a behavioral response by regulated targets that
results in outcomes different from what would otherwise have occurred.4 5 A
researcher seeking to assess the performance of performance standards should
consider broadly the impact of a regulatory scheme on: (1) the outcomes
embedded within the performance standard's command (e.g., SO 2 emissions
below X level); (2) the outcomes that the performance standard is intended to
achieve (e.g., reduced acid rain); and (3) other relevant or desired outcomes,
even if not actually contemplated by the standard's terms or by its designers
(e.g., side effects, compliance costs, and such). In short, the outcomes
embedded in the performance standard are not necessarily the only outcomes of
concern to a retrospective evaluator -or to the public.
Under any relevant evaluation measure, a given performance standard's
ultimate performance will undoubtedly be affected by a number of factors
related to both its design and implementation, including: the nature of the
problem that the standard seeks to address; the make-up, capacities, and
motivations of the firms and individuals within the regulated sector; and the
capacity and resources available to the regulator. Still, we would generalize that
how well a performance standard will work in practice will be affected
primarily by:
" The accuracy of the regulators' assessment methods in
determining whether actual outcomes in use match the levels in
the regulation, for reasons already noted. Assessment methods
may be inaccurate because of a range of factors, including faulty
instrumentation or modeling, infrequent or inaccurate monitoring
and data collection, undetected evasive behavior of regulated
targets, and so forth.
" The sufficiency of the consequences (e.g., penalties for
noncompliance), both in terms of their probability and level. Even
if the regulator can accurately assess individual firms'
compliance, if it fails to monitor or respond when monitoring
detects noncompliance, regulated targets will have little incentive
to change their behavior.
• The congruence in the relationship between outcomes. In order to
effect the desired ultimate outcome motivating the regulation, the
outcome embedded within a performance standard must be
related to that ultimate outcome of concern. Otherwise, even if
the regulator could induce perfect compliance with the standard,
there would be insufficient change in what the regulator (and
society) ultimately cares about.
45. For a discussion of empirical evaluation methods, see LAWRENCE B. MOHR,
IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR PROGRAM EVALUATION (2d ed. 1995).
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Given these factors, it is entirely conceivable that two otherwise similar
performance-based standards could operate quite differently when implemented
in different jurisdictions, across different time periods, or applied to different
problems or sectors. Having these considerations in mind will help make sense
of the EPA's experience developing and implementing diesel emissions
regulations, and we return to them in our conclusion when drawing out
implications from the agency's regulatory experiences. One of our principal
conclusions is that the EPA's experience regulating diesel emissions suffered
from weaknesses across all three factors affecting the success of performance
standards, and in particular from limitations in the accuracy of the agency's
assessment methods. In other words, a chief challenge that performance
standards pose for regulators is ensuring that the law of the test adequately
brings about the fulfillment of the purposes of the law in action.
II. Regulating Diesel Engine Emissions
Diesel engine emissions have a significant impact on air quality
throughout the United States. Although trucks and buses that use heavy-duty
diesel engines represent no more than 2% of all motor vehicles on the roads in
the United States, they emit approximately 20% of all NOx emissions-from
all sources, even stationary ones.46 They also emit significant quantities of
particulates and other air pollutants. As a result, the stakes for air quality from
diesel emissions are great, and any serious national strategy for addressing air
pollution must include effective regulation of diesel engine emissions,
especially from heavy-duty trucks.
Members of the public in the United States and elsewhere have
recognized air pollution as a serious concern since at least the late nineteenth
century. In 1892, for example, at the height of industrialization in England, the
city of London experienced hundreds of additional deaths due to a serious smog
inversion that lasted for three days.47 Yet until the middle of the last century,
just about the only public remedy available to those who suffered the ill effects
of air pollution was the opportunity to file individual common law nuisance suit
46. The latest data on the number of heavy-duty diesel trucks on U.S. roadways are
from 2002. In that year, there were about 235 million registered vehicles in the United States. See
National Transportation Statistics, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP. (2016), http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/
rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national-transportation-statistics/html/table-1- .1 html. Of these,
only about 4 million were heavy-duty trucks. See Controlling Fine Particulate Matter Under the Clean
Air Act: A Menu of Options, ST. & TERRITORIAL AIR POLLUTION PROGRAM ADMIN. & ASS'N LOC. AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL OFFICIALS t89 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter STAPPA & ALAPCO],
http://www.4cleanair.org/PM25Menu-Final.pdf; Census Bureau, United States 2002 Economic Census:
Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey, U.S. DEP'T COM. 12 (2004), http://www.census.gov/prod/
ec02/ec02tv-us.pdf. On emissions, see STAPP & ALAPCO, supra ("Exhaust from heavy-duty diesel
engines accounts for about 20 percent of all NOx emissions, including those from nonroad diesel and
stationary sources.").
47. See K.C. Heidom, A Chronology of Important Events in the History of Air
Pollution Meteorology to 1970, 59 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC'Y 1589, 1591 (1979).
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actions.48 In 1952, London again experienced a severe smog inversion, this one
lasting five days and resulting in as many as four thousand premature deaths.49
Four years later, the British Parliament adopted its first air pollution control
legislation, portending the new era of environmental regulation in the United
States.
Concerns about air pollution began to grow much more salient in the
United States, particularly in California, starting in the middle of the last
century. The population and industrial expansion in California in the 1940s
generated special pollution problems since the mountains around Los Angeles
tend to trap polluted air. Starting in the 1940s, significant amounts of smog and
other air pollutants began to settle in the Los Angeles basin, making it harder
for individuals to breathe and irritating their eyes and lung passages.
At the time, most of the blame for air pollution centered on large
industrial operations.5° Regulatory officials and scientists thought that
automobiles and trucks played only a minimal role in air pollution, in part
because they assumed that smog came from SO 2 emissions. One report at the
time indicated that cars emitted only about 20 tons of SO2 each day in Los
Angeles, compared with about 800 tons emitted by industrial operations.5
Moreover, since smog had grown prevalent in the Los Angeles basin starting in
1943, when there were actually fewer cars registered than just a few years
before (as auto travel was restricted because of World War II), the prevailing
view held that "it hardly seems probable that a smaller number of cars, being
used much less, suddenly could have created a great smog problem.52
By 1950, research by A. J. Haagen-Smit, a chemist at the California
Institute of Technology, had revealed that smog results from a chemical
reaction between hydrocarbons (HCs) and NOx in the presence of sunlight.5 3
Since automobiles emit both HCs and NOx, they have since been considered a
major cause of air pollution-as well as a major target in its reduction.54 By the
48. For a lucid discussion of the early common law approach to air pollution, see
NOGA MORAG LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR POLLUTION IN THE COMMON LAW
STATE (2003).
49. See Heidorn, supra note 47, at 1593.
50. See Editorial, Smog-Its Cause and Cure, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1948, at A4
(attributing smog to sulfur dioxide emissions from refineries, utilities, and chemical facilities).
51. See Ed Ainsworth, Chart Assembled To Show Progress in War on Smog: Impartial
Report Given on Fight To Eliminate Smoke and Fumes, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1948, at 2 (noting that
"apparently the automobile gets a pretty clean bill of health as a smog creator").
52. Id.
53. See JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY
ON CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 1940-1975, at 78-
80 (1977). For a synopsis of Haagen-Smit's work, see A. J. Haagen-Smit, Chemistry and Physiology of
Los Angeles Smog, 44 INDUS. & ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY 1341 (1952).
54. For some early press accounts linking automobiles with smog, see Ed Ainsworth,
Smog Factor Traced to Auto Exhausts: Larson Says Ozone Is Classified in Findings by Three Scientists,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1954, at A 1; Dewey Linze, Cars Lead in List of Smog's Causes: Exhaust-Produced
Hydrocarbons Top Producer of City Headache, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1956, at 2; Dewey Linze, Auto
Fumes Declared Principle Cause of Smog: What To Do About It Is Scientists' Worry; Devices Must Be
Inexpensive and Efficient, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1956, at 16; No Peril to Health Seen in Smog Alert:
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turn of the twenty-first century, the EPA would come to estimate that
transportation sources in the United States contributed to 56% of NOx
emissions and 47% of hydrocarbon emissions (or more precisely, emissions of
55volatile organic compounds (VOC))-the two principal precursors to ozone.
Transportation today continues to contribute similarly substantial proportions
of ozone-creating pollutants and also accounts for about 25% of all the
emissions of particulates or soot.
56
Even after Haagen-Smit's discovery in the middle of the last century,
however, it was not until much later that diesel engines came to be viewed as
making anything but a relatively minor contribution to the air pollution
problem in the United States. For one thing, only a small fraction of the
automobile fleet has ever been made up of diesel-powered cars. For another, as
recently as the mid-1960s, diesel engines powered only a small fraction of the
trucks on the road.57 Today, however, diesel engines propel about 95% of the
largest trucks on the roads in the United States.
58
Over the years, as regulation has helped to spur dramatic decreases in
automobile emissions, environmental regulators have also targeted heavy-duty
diesel truck engines as a major source of air pollution. To understand the
challenges facing regulators in designing and implementing diesel engine
regulation, it is important to begin with some background on how the diesel
engine operates before turning to the emissions that these engines create and
the major emissions control solutions available. We will then review the major
steps the EPA has taken to regulate emissions from heavy-duty diesel truck
engines, explaining how the law of the test was designed to combat the air
pollution problems created by diesel emissions.
A. The Diesel Engine
A diesel engine operates much like an everyday gasoline-powered car.
Pistons inside the engine's cylinders continuously move up and down,
powering the crankshaft, which in turn propels the vehicle. The typical
gasoline-powered automobile operates in four steps (or strokes):
(1) The pistons move down to pull in a mixture of air and gasoline.
Auto Exhaust Blamed for Ever-Increasing Nitrogen Oxides and Pollution in County, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
21, 1960, at 25.
55. See National Air Quality and Emissions Trends Report, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY 26, 33,36 (1999).
56. See Our Nation's Air: Status and Trends Through 2010, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY 4 (2012). See also JEAN-PAUL RODRIGUE, THE GEOGRAPHY OF TRANSPORT SYSTEMS (3d ed.
2013).
57. See Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Regulating by
Litigation: EPA's Regulation of Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 451, 463 (2004)
(noting "diesel trucks made up only 416,454 out of 16,998,546 trucks in use").
58. See About Clean Diesel Trucking, DIESEL TECH. F. (last visited Oct. 19, 2016),
http://www.dieselforum.org/about-clean-diesel/trucking. See also Morriss et al., supra note 57, at 463.
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(2) The pistons move up, compressing the air and gasoline.
(3) The air-gasoline mixture is then ignited by spark plugs, and the
resulting combustion pushes the pistons down.
(4) The pistons move up, expelling the remaining byproducts from
the combustion process as exhaust.
The diesel engine-so named for the German inventor, Rudolf Diesel, who
perfected it in the 1890s-also depends on the ignition of a fuel-air mixture and
follows a similar four-stroke cycle. But unlike the common gasoline-powered
engine, the fuel in a diesel engine is self-ignited. Combustion occurs from the
high pressure generated in the cylinder, rather than from an externally
introduced electric spark. The fuel is not injected into the air in the cylinder
until the air has already been highly compressed by the piston.59
The diesel engine's compression ratio, which is the ratio between the
volume of the cylinder when the piston is at the top of its stroke and the volume
when the piston is at the bottom, can be about twice as high as in a typical
gasoline-powered automobile engine.6 ° Compressing the air to this greater
extent generates heat needed to ignite the diesel fuel.
Since the heat that causes ignition in the diesel engine is much higher than
that produced by the spark in the gasoline engine, diesel fuel must be much less
volatile than gasoline. While the boiling range for gasoline is about 300 to 2000
C, the range for diesel fuel is 1700 to 3400 C.61 Diesel is heavier and thicker-
almost oily-as it is much less refined than gasoline. A gallon of diesel not
only weighs more than a gallon of gasoline, it also contains more energy. At the
molecular level, diesel fuel contains about 50% more carbon than does
gasoline 62
As a result of their heavier, more carbon-rich fuel, diesel engines get
better fuel economy than gasoline engines-upward of 20% to 30% better
mileage. They also get better performance due to the higher compression ratio.
In addition to delivering higher miles-per-gallon, because diesel is less refined,
it has historically tended to cost less than gasoline.63 Both the lower fuel costs
and the better fuel economy make the diesel engine attractive for truck and bus
59. Self-ignition can-and sometimes unexpectedly does-occur with gasoline
engines. When the pressure gets too high in the piston chamber of a gasoline engine, knocking occurs as
the fuel-air mixture ignites from excessive pressure. Octane measures how resistant a fuel is to self-
igniting, with engine knocking less likely with higher-octane gasolines.
60. See BERNARD CHALLEN & RODICA BARANESCU, DIESEL ENGINE REFERENCE
BOOK 473 (2d ed. 1999); Thorsten Raatz & Hermann Grieshaber, Basic Principles of the Diesel Engine,
in DIESEL ENGINE MANAGEMENT: SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS 18 (Konrad Reif ed., 2014) ("The
compression ratio, E, is generally between 16:1 and 24:1 in [diesel] engines for cars and commercial
vehicles.... It is therefore higher than in gasoline engines (c = 7:1 ... 13: 1).").
61. See CHALLEN & BARANESCU, supra note 60, at 99.
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., David Kiley, Diesel vs. Hybrid: From Detroit to D.C., and Back, USA
TODAY (June 11, 2004), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/autos/2004-06-10-diesel-vs-hybrid-x.
htm.
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fleet owners, since fuel costs represent a particularly significant outlay for
vehicles that deliver tens of thousands of miles each year. Diesel engines also
tend to last much longer than gasoline engines; they have fewer parts and are
heavier. For all of these reasons, the diesel engine has long been a mainstay in
the trucking industry.
The advantages of the diesel engine have not, of course, been sufficient to
make diesels the technology of choice to most Americans for their
automobiles.64 With its heavier weight, the diesel engine costs somewhat more
than a gasoline engine at the outset, and the fuel economy cost-savings from
diesels have not proven a sufficient incentive for most ordinary drivers to make
the upfront investment. In addition, while the diesel's higher compression ratio
gives it more power, diesel engines do not accelerate as quickly as gasoline
engines, and they can take longer to warm up in colder weather. For many
years, the diesel engine was also somewhat noisier.
65
That said, diesels' popularity had been growing in the United States
during the early part of the current century.66 Until the Volkswagen scandal,
sales of new diesel automobiles and sport utility vehicles had been increasing at
a rate nearly ten times as fast as overall vehicle sales (although not as fast as
hybrids), as more consumers grew concerned about global climate change and
sought improved fuel economy.67 In the immediate wake of the Volkswagen
scandal, of course, sales of diesel automobiles plummeted.68
B. Diesel Emissions and Their Control
The combustion of fuel that powers the diesel engine has certain
inevitable byproducts, released as exhaust emissions. As noted, the EPA has
identified diesel engines as a significant contributor to the nation's air pollution
problem. Diesel exhaust comprises a variety of pollutants, including most
notably carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, NOx, and particulates. NOx and
particulates have proven exceedingly difficult to manage. Since the Clean Air
Act of 1970, the EPA has created health-based ambient air standards for six
64. See, e.g., The Diesel Dilemma: Diesel's Role in the Race for Clean Cars, UNION
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 7-8 (2004); Dennis Huibregtse, Presentation at Power Systems Research,
Global Strategies, Regional Tactics: Transforming the Heavy Truck Business (May 1,2007).
65. id.; see also WYLE LABORATORIES, TRANSPORTATION NOISE AND NOISE FROM
EQUIPMENT POWERED BY INTERNAL COMBUSTION ENGINES 104 (1971) (noting that "diesel engines are
typically about 10 dB noisier than gasoline engines").
66. See Matthew de Paula, Diesel Boom? Ownership of Diesel Cars Way Up, But Still
a Fraction of U.S. Market, FORBES (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewdepaula/
201.3/04/30/ownership-of-diesel-cars-up-but-still-a-fraction-of-market. Diesel automobiles have been
much more popular in Europe, where they have been commonplace since the 1990s. See John Vidal, The
Rise of Diesel in Europe: The Impact on Health and Pollution, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/22/the-rise-diesel-in-europe-impact-on-health-
pollution.
67. See De Paula, supra note 66.
68. See Jeff Bennett, Diesel Car Sales Tumble in U.S., WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/diesel-car-sales-slow-significantly-1455825746.
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pollutants: (1) carbon monoxide, (2) lead, (3) SO2, (4) ozone, (5) NOx (itself a
precursor to ground-level ozone), and (6) particulate matter. While levels of the
first three pollutants have declined, ozone and particulate levels have remained
high, such that nearly 45% of the U.S. population lives in areas with levels that
the EPA considers unhealthful for one or both of these pollutants.
69
NOx is a brownish, highly reactive gas that is a by-product of combustion,
created when the nitrogen in the air compressed in the diesel engine burns. As a
rule of thumb, as engine temperatures increase, levels of NOx rise. Once
released into the air as exhaust, NOx reacts with hydrocarbons in the presence
of sunlight to form ozone (or 03), a respiratory irritant known as smog.
70
During summer months, ozone levels in major metropolitan areas often reach
levels deemed to be unhealthful. Exposure to ozone at levels found frequently
in Los Angeles, Dallas, New York, Washington, D.C., and many other
American cities during the summer can temporarily decrease lung capacity.7'
In the northeastern United States in July and August, when ozone levels tend to
be especially high, exposure can lead to an increase in respiratory-related
hospital visits.72 Even among healthy adults who are least susceptible to
ozone's effects, exposure can weaken immune systems and make people more
vulnerable to respiratory diseases such as pneumonia. The EPA finds that
exposure to elevated levels of ozone is also a likely cause of detectable levels
of premature mortality.73 Young children, senior citizens, and those with
respiratory conditions face the greatest risks.
In addition to contributing to ground-level ozone, NOx is a respiratory
irritant in its own right. Those who are exposed may experience sore throats,
decreased lung function, and greater susceptibility to respiratory infections.
Health effects are more pronounced for children, the elderly, and those whose
respiratory systems are already impaired with asthma or other conditions.74 In
addition to affecting human health, NOx can directly affect environmental
conditions through its contribution to acid rain.
7 5
Particulates, more commonly known as dust, soot, and smoke, are the
products of incomplete combustion in the diesel engine. Particulates, which can
vary in size from visible soot to submicron particles, come from the unburned
portions of the fuel. Tiny, fine particulates are of greatest concern because they
69. See State of the Air: 2015, AM. LUNG ASS'N 6 (2015).
70. In the upper atmosphere, ozone protects humans from the sun's harmful radiation.
71. On the strong association between exposure to ozone and decreased lung capacity,
see Integrated Science Assessment for Ozone and Related Photochemical Oxidants, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY (2013) [hereinafter Integrated Assessment], http://ofmpub.epa.gov/eims/
eimscomm.getfile?p-download-id=511347.
72. See Integrated Science Assessment of Ozone and Related Photochemical Oxidants,
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (2013), http://ofmpub.epa.gov/eims/eimscomm.getfile?p-download-
id=511347.
73. See Integrated Assessment, supra note 71.
74. See Control of Air Pollution from Heavy-Duty Engines, 60 Fed. Reg. 45,580,
45,582-83 (Aug. 31, 1995) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking).
75. See id.
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are easily respirable and, when inhaled, can penetrate deep within the lung. In
1998, the State of California declared particulate emissions contained in diesel
exhaust to be carcinogenic.76 The EPA has similarly found evidence that
exposure to the particulates in diesel exhaust can cause chronic lung disease,
cancer, and premature mortality.77
The federal government's role in controlling air pollution from heavy-
duty diesel engines and associated health effects has grown substantially over
the past half-century. For many years, federal regulators largely ignored the
environmental impact of diesel engines, focusing on the more pressing
problems of pollution from stationary sources and gasoline-powered motor
vehicles. Initially, the federal role was mainly to support state programs. When
government did start to regulate diesels, it first focused on the most obvious
problems of smoke and odor. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, the federal
government, through the EPA, imposed increasingly stringent emissions
standards on additional types of emissions. As regulation of stationary sources
and automobiles corresponded with the reduction in pollution from these
sources, diesel's share in the nation's air pollution problem grew more
prominent. Over the past several decades, the EPA has moved aggressively to
control pollution from heavy-duty diesel engines because, as other sources of
NOx emissions have been controlled, the proportion of overall ambient levels
of ozone attributable to diesel engines has tended to increase. In tandem with
the tightening of emissions standards for diesel engines, the EPA has devised
and updated testing protocols in an effort to make emissions tests more closely
approximate real-world conditions.
Manufacturers of heavy-duty diesel engines have used a variety of
mechanisms to control emissions, including modifications to engine operating
conditions, changes to fuel, and after-treatment. Until recently, manufacturers
met government emissions standards through the first of these strategies,
relying on electronic engine controls to keep pollution within regulatory limits
by adjusting fuel injection techniques and timing, air intake management, oil
lubrication, and exhaust gas recirculation.78 When the timing of the injection of
76. See Testimony of Dr. Alan C. Lloyd, Chairman, California Air Resources Board,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle Standards and Highway Diesel
Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements 2 (June 27, 2000), http://www.4cleanair.org/HDETst-LosAngeles-
June2000.PDF.
77. In 2013, the EPA formally recognized these health effects in the course of
amending its national ambient air quality standard for particulates. See Control of Air Pollution from
Heavy-Duty Engines, 78 Fed. Reg. 3086 (Jan. 15, 2013). The weight of the scientific research on the
carcinogenic properties of diesel emissions is "strong," according to the EPA health assessments of
diesel exhaust emissions. Health Assessment Document for Diesel Engine Exhaust, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY 7-142 (2002). Other analysis of data underlying the EPA's assessment suggests
that the relationship, if any, between diesel engine exhaust and cancer may be more complicated. See
Suresh H. Moolgavkar et al., Diesel Engine Exhaust and Lung Cancer Mortality: Time-Related Factors
in Exposure and Risk, 35 RISK ANALYSIS 663 (2015).
78. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Proposed Heavy-Duty
Engine and Vehicle Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg.
35,466 (June 2, 2000).
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the fuel is varied, the levels of NOx emissions vary too, depending on the
temperature when the fuel enters the combustion chamber. Similarly,
particulate levels vary with injection techniques and timing. For example, fine,
homogeneous dispersion generally leads to more even and complete burning of
the fuel and the release of fewer particles. Engine timing that introduces fuel
into the chamber at higher temperatures in the compression cycle will also
reduce particulate emissions.
Only more recently, as the EPA has tightened its standards further, have
manufacturers started to use after-treatment-namely, devices to clean the
exhaust after combustion. With manufacturers adopting particulate traps,
nitrogen adsorbers, and other after-treatment technologies, the EPA now
requires that heavy-duty diesel engines bum low-sulfur fuel, as the sulfur in
fuel can interfere with the effectiveness of after-treatment devices.79
A fundamental challenge that both regulators and manufacturers have had
to confront has been how to reduce NOx and particulate emissions
simultaneously. Particulates are products of incomplete combustion, while NOx
forms when nitrogen in the air is sucked into the engine cylinder and, due to
high temperatures, combines with oxygen. If manufacturers adjust diesel
engines to operate at high temperatures in order to destroy particulates, they
elevate NOx levels. Adjusting engine parameters to operate at lower engine
temperatures reduces NOx emissions, but increases particulates. The existence
of these tradeoffs only reinforces how complicated it can be to regulate diesel
emissions. The EPA has long recognized the countervailing relationship
between particulate and NOx control strategies and has urged "great care" in
"balancing tradeoffs between NOx and particulate emissions."80 In a 1981
proposed rule, for example, the agency noted that achieving a 75% reduction
target for NOx as mandated under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
would require methods "such as retarded timing which increase fuel
consumption and increase particulate emissions markedly."'8' The EPA even
concluded that, "if diesels [were] to meet or even approach" the level required
by the Act, "some increase in particulate emissions may have to result.82
An additional challenge facing regulators seeking to address pollution
from heavy-duty diesel engines is that these engines are built to last. The EPA
requires manufacturers to build engines with emissions controls that are
79. See Assessment & Standards Div., Small Entity Compliance Guide for "Control of
Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy Engines and Vehicle Standards and Highway Diesel
Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements," U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (last visited Oct. 10, 2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/compliance-hd-engines.pdf.
80. Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines: Gaseous Emission Regulations for 1987 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicles, Light-
Duty Trucks, and Heavy-Duty Engines; Particulate Emission Regulations for 1987 and Later Model
Year Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines, 49 Fed. Reg. 40,258, 40,269 (proposed Oct. 15, 1984).
81. Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
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sufficiently durable to function throughout the engine's "useful life."
Throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, the EPA has increased its estimates
of the "useful life" of a heavy-duty diesel engine. In 1971, the EPA estimated
the useful life of a heavy-duty diesel engine to be 100,000 miles.83 Later, the
EPA revised this number to 290,000 miles,84 and later still to 435,000 miles.8
5
Until the early part of this century, the EPA had no means to test whether
engines were maintaining emissions standards over their lives, short of
requiring owners to bring in their trucks, remove the engines, and test the
emissions in a laboratory- something clearly not feasible. Consequently, the
EPA was unable to know how long emissions control techniques or
technologies lasted in use. In addition to the practical constraint associated with
ensuring that trucks do not pollute more than allowed over their long lives,
longevity of these engines has meant that older trucks stay on the road for many
years. Advances in pollution control can thus take many years to come into
force and begin delivering payoffs in terms of cleaner air.
The structure of the heavy-duty diesel engine industry-its integration,
concentration, and customer base-also holds implications for regulation. In
contrast with the automobile manufacturing industry, the heavy-duty truck
industry has historically not been vertically integrated. That is, most heavy-duty
diesel engine manufacturers do not manufacture and sell truck bodies, and
those companies that do make truck bodies tend not to make engines.86 This
lack of integration complicates the process of engine redesign.87 Any
substantial change to the engine will have repercussions for design of the entire
vehicle, but these changes will have to be implemented by separate
organizations. Consequently, technological innovation in this part of the
transportation sector has not always occurred easily.
Manufacturing of heavy-duty diesel engines also takes place in a
concentrated industry. The top three manufacturers -Caterpillar, Cummins,
and Navistar- control more than 50% of the market.88 A more highly
83. See Definition of "Useful Life" and Requirements for Maintenance Instructions,
36 Fed. Reg. 16,905 (Aug. 26, 1971).
84. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines; Gaseous Emission Regulations for 1985 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Trucks, Gaseous
and Evaporative Emission Regulations for 1985 and Later Model Year Heavy-Duty Engines, and
Emission Regulations for 1978 and Later Model Year Motorcycles, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,170, 52,171 (Nov.
18, 1983).
85. See Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Highway Heavy-Duty Engines, 61
Fed. Reg. 33,421 (proposed June 27, 1996) [hereinafter 61 Fed. Reg. 33,4211; see also Control of
Emissions of Air Pollution from Highway Heavy-Duty Engines, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,694 (Oct. 21, 1997)
(finalizing the revision in the definition of useful life to 435,000 miles).
86. See Morriss et al., supra note 57, at 451.
87. See id. at 452; Anthony M. Fiore, Industry Surveys, Heavy Equipment & Trucks,
STANDARD & POOR'S (Apr. 5, 2007), http://www.netadvantage.standardandpoors.com/NASApp/
NetAdvantage/showlndustrySurveyPDF.d?task=showlndustrySurvey&cde=het&type=pdf&date=pdf/
het_0407.pdf.
88. See Brandon Ruiz, Heavy-Duty Diesel Engine Manufacturing in the US, IBIS
WORLD INDUSTRY REP. (2014), http://clientsl.ibisworld.com/reports/us/industry/majorcompanies.aspx.
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concentrated industry can make it relatively more manageable for government
to regulate, as fewer firms need to be overseen.89 However, heavy-duty diesel
engine manufacturers do not directly serve retail-level consumers but instead
serve other major businesses (the truck manufacturers) that in turn have other
businesses as their customers (the trucking companies). This structure changes
the dynamics of regulatory compliance and enforcement. Unlike Volkswagen
and other automobile manufacturers, heavy-duty diesel truck engine
manufacturers do not face the same kinds of reinforcing market pressures for
regulatory compliance that companies selling directly to millions of retail
customers do.9"
The very kind of business consequences and public relations ramifications
that Volkswagen has experienced presumably should have provided an
additional deterrent against that company flouting the law. Although even that
additional deterrent was apparently not sufficient to check Volkswagen's
behavior, it does seem to have affected how the company has acted after the
initial allegations of illegalities became public. Compared to the heavy-duty
diesel engine manufacturers that faced similar charges in the 1990s,
Volkswagen has acted much more swiftly and resolutely to address its legal
difficulties, including by making public apologies. Most members of the public
undoubtedly never became aware of, or cared much about, the accusations
against the heavy-duty diesel truck engine manufacturers, while a very large
fraction of the public heard about the Volkswagen scandal.
C. Early Efforts To Regulate Motor Vehicles: 1959-1970
The regulation of diesel emissions today has grown from the much deeper
roots of motor vehicle regulation more generally. The first major instance of
motor vehicle emissions regulations in the United States occurred in 1959 when
the California Assembly enacted legislation requiring the state Department of
Public Health to establish air quality standards for motor vehicles. At the time,
states -particularly California-were the primary environmental regulators,
while the federal government's role was to shore up state efforts. Federal air
Other major companies include General Electric and Detroit Diesel, now a subsidiary of Daimler AG.
Id.
89. Relatedly, and unlike in the automobile industry, foreign competition has not
traditionally been significant in manufacturing of heavy-duty diesels. See Fiore, supra note 87. The
major companies in the industry have historically been based in the United States. In more recent years,
however, the industry has confronted global pressures and pursued international market opportunities.
Consolidation has taken place between U.S.-based corporations and foreign manufacturers, while both
production facilities and customer bases have shifted in a global direction. See Ruiz, supra note 88.
90. It is generally accepted that firms face more than just regulatory pressures to
manage the environmental impacts of their operations and products; they also confront social and
economic pressures. Among the economic pressures can be customer demands for responsible
regulatory compliance and environmental protection. See NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SHADES OF
GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND ENVIRONMENT (2003); FOREST L. REINHARDT, DOWN TO EARTH:
APPLYING BUSINESS PRINCIPLES TO ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (2000).
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pollution control activities focused mostly on providing research and technical
expertise to support state pollution control programs.9'
These roles started to shift in the 1960s. In 1966, California established
mobile source emissions standards for hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide,
raising concerns among automakers that a patchwork of state standards would
impose significant costs for products manufactured for a national market. The
federal Air Quality Act of 1967 addressed this concern by preempting state
efforts to establish mobile source emissions standards, with the exception of
California. For mobile sources, this same allocation of regulatory authority-
federal primacy, with an exception for California-remains to this day under
the 1970 Clean Air Act and its progeny. The federal EPA issues the principal
nationwide mobile source emissions standards, with an exception for
California, which is allowed to set its own standards (and other states can
choose to adopt California's standards if they prefer).
When it comes to the regulation of diesel engine emissions, for many
years, neither state nor federal regulators directly addressed them. During the
1950s and 1960s, diesel-powered vehicles were relatively rare and contributed
only a small fraction of the pollutants responsible for the health and visibility
problems of the time. As a result, state and federal lawmakers concerned about
air pollution directed their attention elsewhere. The federal Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Act of 1965 gave the Secretary of the Department of Health
Education and Welfare (HEW) a broad mandate to address "the emission of
any kind of substance, from any class or classes of motor vehicles or new
motor engines, which in [the Secretary's] judgment cause or contribute to, or
are likely to cause or contribute to air pollution which endangers the health or
welfare of any person.'"92 However, the HEW regulations that followed from
this legislative grant of authority only addressed emissions from cars.
When lawmakers did finally act to address pollution from diesel engines,
they focused on the most obvious manifestations of the pollution problem from
diesel trucks: black smoke and foul odor. The federal Air Quality Act of 1967
authorized HEW to establish smoke emissions standards for diesel engines.
Those standards were performance-based, stipulating that diesel engine exhaust
should not obscure the transmission of a beam of light by more than 20%,
except for brief "peak" periods.93 That act also helped establish the basic
framework for regulating other diesel emissions that still applies today: namely,
91. See, e.g., Air Pollution Control Research and Technical Assistance Act of 1955 §
2, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322.
92. Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act § 302(a), Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat.
992,992 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012)).
93. See David F. Merrion, Heavy Duty Diesel Emissions, Fifty Years: 1960 to 2010,
AM. SOC'Y MECHANICAL ENGINEERS (2002). The EPA later promulgated these standards in Control of
Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines, 36 Fed. Reg. 22,448, 22,452
(Nov. 25, 1971).
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pollutant-specific performance standards coupled with detailed procedures for
testing performance.
D. Regulating Heavy-Duty Diesel Engine Emissions: 1970-1990
The passage of the federal Clean Air Act of 1970 was a key event in the
regulation of all sources of air pollution. The Act mandated ambitious
reductions of critical pollutants from motor vehicles, such as a 90% reduction
in levels of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons by 1975, and a similar
reduction in NOx levels by 1976. Congress authorized states to regulate
reductions in emissions from vehicles already on the roads using inspection
programs and transportation control plans, but gave the federal EPA clear
authority to regulate pollution from new vehicles.
The Act led to a series of broad-ranging environmental rules, among them
a few that addressed controls for diesel engine exhaust. In 1972, the federal
EPA took action to control NOx, carbon monoxide, and hydrocarbon emissions
from heavy-duty diesel engines.94 The standards were performance-based,
limiting carbon monoxide emissions to 40 g/BHP-hr and imposing a combined
limit of 16 g/BHP-hr for hydrocarbons and NOx.95 The standards required
manufacturers to test prototype engines' emissions using a protocol known as
the "steady-state" test-basically running each engine type through thirteen
separate modes of operation (i.e., different speeds and torques) specified by the
EPA and averaging the emissions results collected by an analyzer connected to
the exhaust.96 The EPA understood that diesel manufacturers would meet
emissions standards by adjusting engine operating parameters. For example, in
its September 1972 final rule, the EPA acknowledged that manufacturers would
need to retard injection timing to meet the NOx standard.97
The EPA proposed more stringent emissions standards in 1976.98 It also
proposed to toughen its testing procedures, requiring new types of analyzers for
measuring pollutants in exhaust. Manufacturers objected to the EPA's proposed
rules, arguing that they needed more time to meet the rules' new
instrumentation and testing requirements. In its final rule, the EPA allowed
manufacturers to continue to use existing testing protocols through the 1979
94. The new federal rules were identical for most part to those California had enacted
just the previous year, except the effective date: 1974, instead of 1973.
95. See Heavy-Duty Engines, 37 Fed. Reg. 18,262, 18,264 (Sept. 8, 1972). For these
and other emissions limits for heavy-duty diesel engines, regulators have used grams of emissions per
brake horsepower-hour-g/BHP-hr-which basically tracks the relationship between emissions and the
amount of work the engine exerts, as measured by a dynamometer or friction brake applied to the
vehicle's drive shaft.
96. Id. at 18,269-70.
97. Id.
98. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicle Engines: Certification and
Test Procedures, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,292 (May 24, 1976).
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model years, but required manufacturers to adopt the new procedures
thereafter.
99
The following year, Congress adopted the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, which again called for dramatic reductions in air pollution from mobile
sources, including specifically mandated reductions from heavy-duty engines.
Congress extended the deadlines for meeting the general motor vehicle
reductions called for by the 1970 Act, but it also mandated a 90% reduction in
hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions from heavy-duty engines
beginning with the 1983 model year and a 75% reduction in NOx emissions by
1985.100 These amendments further required the EPA to promulgate a standard
for control of particulate emissions for vehicles manufactured in 1981 and
thereafter.,'
The EPA responded to Congress' mandate in 1979 with a proposed rule
that, instead of calling for more stringent emissions standards, defined a new
testing procedure to replace the steady-state test. 2 That new procedure, known
as the transient test, required manufacturers to test emissions in the laboratory
during a 20-minute "driving cycle" specified by the EPA. 3 Not only did the
test analyze emissions during different modes (like the steady-state test), but it
also analyzed emissions while the cars shifted between modes, when the
engines might release more emissions.0 4
The EPA considered the transient test, a product of more than five years
of research at the agency, an essential component of its diesel control program.
The EPA argued that the 1977 Amendments' target of a 90% reduction
compared to baseline levels had already been largely realized for hydrocarbon
and carbon monoxide emissions.'0 5 Attaining the goals articulated in the
Amendments for particulates and NOx, however, would require a substantial'
effort, and the EPA believed the existing testing protocol would be inadequate
for that purpose. In supplementary information included in its proposed rule,
the EPA explained its motives in greater detail: "As the emission standards
become more stringent the motivation to design around the test procedures will
99. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle
Engines; Certification and Test Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 45,132 (Sept. 8, 1977).
100. Congress permitted the EPA to establish a less rigorous standard if the 75%
reduction level could not be reached "without increasing cost or decreasing fuel economy to an
excessive and unreasonable degree." Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 202(a)(3)(C), Pub. L. No.
95-95, 91 Stat. 685, 765 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7521).
101. Id. § 224. Congress called on the EPA to reach "the greatest degree of emission
reduction achievable" after giving "appropriate consideration to the cost .... and to noise, energy, and
safety factors associated with the application of such technology." Id. § 202(a)(3)(A)(iii).
102. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle
Engines, 44 Fed. Reg. 9464 (Feb. 13, 1979) [hereinafter 44 Fed. Reg. 9464].
103. Id.
104. We discuss the transient testing protocol further in Section H.F, infra.
105. See 44 Fed. Reg. 9464, supra note 102, at 9466.
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be increased .... In fact, even at current levels, the steady-state procedures do
not provide an accurate assessment of true, real world reductions."
' 0 6
The EPA needed a more accurate test to ensure compliance with the tough
new particulate and NOx standards it was working to develop. The transient
test, it maintained, would provide that accuracy.
Engine manufacturers "roundly criticized" the EPA's proposal for the
transient test, arguing that it was not justified, failed to represent "real life
operation," and was not valid. °7 In its final rule, adopted in 1980, the EPA
retained the transient test it had proposed, concluding that it was "necessary
and appropriate."'0 8 The agency also prescribed new emissions standards for
heavy-duty diesel engines to be achieved using the transient test: reducing NOx
to 10.7 g/BHP-hr, carbon monoxide to 15.5 g/BHR-hr, and hydrocarbons to 1.3
g/BHP-hr, all to be effective by 1984.'09 The EPA allowed manufacturers to
continue to use the steady-state test for one more year, until 1985, provided
they could meet a more rigorous emissions standard."0
Spurred by the 1977 Amendments' mandate that the EPA regulate
particulate emissions, in 1981 the EPA proposed a performance-based
particulate standard of 0.25 g/BHR-hr. In the background to the proposed rule,
the EPA noted that heavy-duty diesel engines emit more than twice the
particulate emissions of gasoline-powered engines of comparable size."'
Regulations coming into effect in 1984 for gasoline-powered engines would in
effect require manufacturers to use catalytic converters to control emissions,
reducing particulates from that source by 95% to 98%. However, no
comparable requirement was in place for diesel-powered engines. "Without
regulation," the agency noted, "heavy-duty diesels will emit 40 - 100 times the
particulate emitted by the ... 1984 and later model year gasoline engines."' 12
In addition, the agency anticipated significant growth in the use of diesel
engines over the coming years. At the time of the 1981 proposed rulemaking,
the EPA estimated that one-third of heavy-duty engines were powered by
diesel. It predicted that, by 1995, that percentage would nearly double."3 Air
quality would likely deteriorate significantly, particularly in urban areas and
near busy highways."4 Recall that the EPA's regulation of diesel exhaust had
focused to this point on gaseous emissions-NOx, carbon monoxide, and
106. Id. at 9465.
107. Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Engines;
Gaseous Emission Regulations for 1984 and Later Model Year Heavy-Duty Engines, 45 Fed. Reg. 4136,
4147 (Jan. 21, 1980) [hereinafter 45 Fed. Reg. 4136].
108. Id.
109. See id. at 4137.
110. Seeid. at4138.
111. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines; Particulate Regulation for Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines, 46 Fed. Reg. 1,910 (Jan. 7, 1981).
112. Id. at 1910.
113. Seeid. at 1911.
114. See id.
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hydrocarbons. HEW had regulated smoke emissions from diesels in the late
1960s, but the EPA viewed those controls as crude tools for achieving the
ambitious particulate goals laid down in the 1977 Amendments.
To meet its new 0.25 g/BHR-hr proposed particulate standard, the EPA
expected that manufacturers would have to use a trap-oxidizer technology.
Trap-oxidizer technology was already substantially established, so from the
EPA's perspective, the proposed rule was "technology forcing" only in that it
required the adoption of a technology that manufacturers otherwise would not
have used.' 5 The agency acknowledged, however, that manufacturers would
need to adapt trap-oxidizers substantially for use in heavy-duty diesel
116engines.
The proposed particulates rule also included provisions for testing these
emissions.7  The EPA proposed that manufacturers add particulate
measurement instruments to the transient test and measure particulate
emissions simultaneously with gaseous emissions."8
Less than two weeks after proposing its new particulate standard, on
January 19, 1981, the EPA publicly announced plans to tighten its standard for
NOx." 9 The EPA calculated that the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments'
mandate for a 75% reduction in overall NOx emissions translated into an
emissions standard for heavy-duty diesel engines of 1.7 g/BHP-hr.1 20 The EPA
had been concerned, however, that a standard set at this level would not be
technologically feasible, and it had sought help from industry in choosing a
more realistic standard. Based on confidential information it received from
engine manufacturers, the EPA announced in its advance notice of proposed
rulemaking on NOx that it would consider a standard of 4.0 g/BHP-hr to be
appropriate, and it would probably make this standard effective one year after
the congressional target (1986).21
After announcing these regulatory plans in early 1981, the EPA's efforts
to regulate particulates and NOx from heavy-duty diesel engines seemed to lose
momentum. A new President-Ronald Reagan-had assumed office, and the
agency took no formal regulatory action to finalize its plans to control either
pollutant in 1982 or in 1983. Frustrated by the agency's inactivity, the Natural
Resources Defense Council, an environmental group, filed suit against the EPA
115. Id. at 1915.
116. See id. at 1919.
117. See id. at 1918.
118. Id. The EPA had crafted the transient test knowing that it would soon propose
more stringent standards for particulates and NOx. It maintained that the transient test protocol was
suitable for the new standards; all that was required was additional instrumentation.
119. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines; Gaseous Emission Regulations for 1985 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Trucks and 1986
and Later Model Year Heavy-Duty Engines, 46 Fed. Reg. 5838 (Jan. 19, 1981) (advance notice of
proposed rulemaking).
120. See id.
121. See id. at 5845.
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in 1984. In September 1984, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia ordered the EPA to propose rules to control NOx pollutants within
30 days and to issue final rules on NOx and particulates by March, 1985.22
The agency met the court's deadlines.2 3 In its proposed NOx rule, the
EPA estimated that, within a decade, heavy-duty diesel engines would
contribute over one-third of all NOx emissions.24 The need to control these
emissions, the agency reported, would be essential for meeting the EPA's
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for NOx and ozone. In its
final rule, however, the EPA backtracked, stating that "the environmental need
for reductions in NOx emissions is not as immediate.125 It also established
NOx performance standards that were less stringent than those it had suggested
in its 1981 advance notice of proposed rulemaking, adopting limits of only 6.0
g/BHP-hr beginning in 1989, and 5.0 g/BHP-hr beginning in 1991.126 For
particulate emissions, the EPA established a standard of 0.60 g/BHP-hr in
1988, and a 0.25 g/BHP-hr standard in 1991.127 The Engine Manufacturers
Association (EMA) promptly sued the EPA for failing to provide
manufacturers four years of lead-time as required by the Clean Air Act. In a
November 1986 decision, the D.C. Circuit decided for the EMA, holding that
the initial 6.0 g/BHP-hr NOx standard could not go into effect until 1990.128
Figure 1 summarizes federal regulation of heavy-duty diesel engine
emissions during the 1970s and 1980s. Prior to 1974, the only federal emissions
regulations that applied to diesels concerned their smoke. From 1974 to 1990,
though, federal regulations became increasingly stringent, particularly for
carbon monoxide. Federal controls for NOx did not come into force until 1984,
and for particulates until 1988. The EPA's requirement that manufacturers test
emissions using the transient test in 1985 meant that performance testing came
somewhat closer to representing real-world conditions.
122. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Ruckelshaus, 21 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 1953
(D.D.C. Sept. 14, 1984).
123. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle
Engines: Gaseous Emission Regulations for 1987 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicles, Light-
Duty Trucks, and Heavy-Duty Engines; Particulate Emission Regulations for 1987 and Later Model
Year Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines, 49 Fed. Reg. 40,258 (Oct. 15, 1984) [hereinafter 49 Fed. Reg.
40,2581; Control of Air Pollution From New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines; Gaseous
Emission Regulations for 1987 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicles, and for 1988 and Later
Model Year Light-Duty Trucks and Heavy-Duty Engines; Particulate Emission Regulations for 1988
and Later Model Year Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines, 50 Fed. Reg. 10,606 (Mar. 15, 1985) [hereinafter 50
Fed. Reg. 10,606].
124. See 49 Fed. Reg. 40,258, supra note 123, at 40,261.
125. See 50 Fed. Reg. 10,606, supra note 123.
126. Id. at 10,623. The EPA found that the 4.0 g/BHR-hr standard would be
technologically infeasible to meet in the 1991-93 period.
127. Id. at 10,606.
128. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 410 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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Figure 1: U.S. EPA Standards for Heavy-Duty
Diesel Engine Emissions, 1974-1990
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E. The 1990 Clean Air Act and Beyond
Although air quality across the United States had generally improved
during the 1970s and 1980s, ozone pollution continued to be a serious health
concern. Air pollution levels frequently exceeded the NAAQS for ozone on
summer days in urban areas. Heavy-duty diesel engines contributed to the
ozone problem by emitting large quantities of ozone precursors, namely
hydrocarbons and NOx. In 1990, Congress adopted major amendments to the
Clean Air Act, including provisions that addressed emissions from heavy-duty
diesel engines. Specifically, Congress ordered the EPA to establish standards
for carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, NOx, and particulates, ensuring that they
would "reflect the greatest degree of emission reduction achievable through the
application of [available] technology .... giving appropriate consideration to
cost, energy, and safety factors."'129
129. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 201, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399,
2472 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a)(3)(C) (West 1995)).
I
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As the EPA tightened its standards for mobile source emissions, it did so
through rules that provided manufacturers flexibility in how they achieved
them. During the period from 1990 to 1995, the EPA issued rules allowing
manufacturers to average, bank, and trade credits in reductions of emissions of
NOx and particulates from different engine models.1 30 The rules also permitted
manufacturers to sell engines that exceeded the EPA standards, provided that
they paid a non-conformance penalty set at a level intended to reduce the
financial advantage from noncompliance.131 The averaging, banking, and
trading provisions allowed a manufacturer whose vehicles' emissions were
below the standards to apply those extra reductions as a credit toward emissions
from some of the manufacturer's other models, as long as average emissions
across all the manufacturer's engine types fell below the EPA standard. A
manufacturer could also bank reduction credits for another model year to use to
meet the EPA standard at a later time, or it could even trade or sell extra
reductions to another manufacturer. Non-compliance penalties allowed a
manufacturer to pay a penalty but still sell vehicles that exceeded an emissions
standard when a more stringent standard became substantially difficult for the
manufacturer to meet.
The EPA's flexible stance with heavy-duty diesel engine manufacturers
reached a milestone in 1995 when the agency entered into an agreement with
all of the major engine manufacturers and the California Air Resources
Board.132 Under the agreement, called the Statement of Principles, all the
parties agreed that heavy-duty diesel engine manufacturers would reduce NOx
emissions by half. Manufacturers would be able to choose between two
standards. They could meet either a combined non-methane hydrocarbon
(NMHC) and NOx standard of 2.4 g/BHP-hr, or a combined NMHC and NOx
standard of 2.5 g/BHR-hr standard with a NMHC cap of 0.5 g/BHP-hr. The
Statement of Principles also outlined a plan for developing technology to
achieve an even more rigorous NOx standard of 1.0 g/BHP-hr and a particulate
standard of 0.5 g/BHP-hr. In addition, manufacturers agreed to study the
durability of engine controls to ensure that emissions stayed within required
limits throughout an engine's life, which the EPA estimated to be 435,000
miles.133
In return for manufacturers' agreement to meet tightened requirements by
2004 and to study further reductions, the EPA agreed not to change the
particulate standard, which at the time stood at 0.1 g/BHP-hr, and not to change
130. See Certification Programs for Banking and Trading of Oxides of Nitrogen and
Particulate Emission Credits for Heavy-Duty Engines, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,584 (July 26, 1990).
131. See, e.g., Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor
Vehicle Engines; Nonconformance Penalties for Heavy-Duty Engines and Heavy-Duty Vehicles,
Including Heavy Light-Duty Trucks, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,532 (Dec. 28, 1993).
132. This was included as an appendix in Control of Air Pollution From Heavy-Duty
Engines, 60 Fed. Reg. 45,580 (Aug. 31, 1995) (advance notice of proposed rulemaking).
133. Control of Air Pollution from Heavy-Duty Engines, 60 Fed. Reg. 45,580, 45,600
(Aug. 31, 1995).
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testing procedures.34 While manufacturers might ordinarily have opposed the
more stringent NOx standards, the principles gave them a clear sense of what to
expect from future regulation in California and at the federal level. For all
parties, the principles provided "certainty and stability,' 35 as well as the
promise of cleaner air. The EPA formalized the Statement of Principles in a
final rule in October 1997.36
F. EPA's Testing Protocol
The environmental performance of heavy-duty diesel engines is a function
of both the stringency of the emissions standard and the testing procedures that
manufacturers must follow to assess compliance with that standard. Throughout
the two-and-a-half decades in which the EPA has regulated emissions from
these engines, the EPA's rules have specified both emissions limits and testing
procedures. In its smoke emissions rule published in 1971, for example, the
EPA described a numerical standard and a performance test that diesel exhaust
must meet: opacity no greater than 40% during acceleration and 20% during
lugging,'137 and, after an idling period, manufacturers must operate the engine
through three acceleration and lugging modes of specified time periods.38
Of course, the EPA's ultimate concern lies with the effects of emissions
spewed by trucks and buses as they travel on highways and city streets. But
testing emissions from trucks and buses as they operate on the roads has posed
particular challenges for the EPA. Until the mid-2000s, no feasible method
existed to test emissions from heavy-duty diesel engine-powered vehicles.
Instead, manufacturers had to test engine emissions in a laboratory setting with
the engine sitting on a block rather than in a vehicle. The inability to test
vehicles in use has resulted in important implications for the EPA's
performance-based regulation of heavy-duty diesel engine emissions.
As noted in Section II.D, the EPA's initial testing protocol for its first
gaseous emissions standards for heavy-duty diesel engines required
manufacturers to remove the engine from its chassis and mount it on a
dynamometer in a laboratory. The engine would then be run through a 13-mode
cycle intended to simulate "a truck driving pattern in a metropolitan area,"'3 9
with tubes connected to measure the emissions produced. Each mode within
this "steady-state test" represented the engine operating at a specified speed and
load.
134. See id. at 45,602.
135. id.
136. See Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Highway Heavy-Duty Engines,
62 Fed. Reg. 54,694, 54,700 (Oct. 21, 1997).
137. See Exhaust Emissions (Heavy Duty Diesel Engines), 36 Fed. Reg. 22,452 (Nov.
25, 1971).
138. Test Procedures for Engine Exhaust Emissions (Heavy Duty Diesel Engines), 36
Fed. Reg. 22,470-22,474 (Nov. 25, 1971).
139. Heavy-Duty Engines, 36 Fed. Reg. 19,402 (Oct. 5, 1971).
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When the EPA subsequently adopted its transient test in 1980, it
amounted to a major breakthrough in making the test a much closer
approximation to real-world driving conditions.140 The transient test required
manufacturers to test emissions from engines running at a continually changing
set of speed/torque conditions, a far more comprehensive procedure than the
13-mode steady-state test.41 The EPA based its transient test on driving
conditions in New York and Los Angeles. The test began with speed/torque
ratios intended to replicate stop-and-go non-highway driving in New York, and
was followed by speed/torque ratios modeled on slow but steady driving in
urban Los Angeles. After these two slow phases, the test then called for
conditions similar to crowded highway driving in Los Angeles. It ended with a
repeat of the stop-and-go New York driving conditions. The test was carried
out twice, once with a cold start and once with a warm start, with a twenty-
minute interval between the two cycles.
Although this transient test was a much more complete test than the
former steady-state testing protocol because it sampled emissions even during
transitions from different driving conditions, the transient test was still
artificial. Manufacturers still measured emissions from engines that ran only for
about forty minutes total in a laboratory setting under a defined set of
parameters -rather than longer-term monitoring of vehicles in-use.14 The
implications of this testing protocol became increasingly evident after 1998,
when the EPA decided to file an enforcement action against the manufacturers
of heavy-duty diesel engines, charging them with systematically gaming the
agency's performance-based regulatory system.
III. The NOx Lawsuit and Its Aftermath
The fact that the EPA's protocol calls for testing engines in a lab, rather
than monitoring trucks on the road, calls to mind the common wisdom that the
law "on the books" often differs from the law "in action." Behind the EPA's
performance-based regulation of diesel emissions was the assumption that more
stringent standards would lower ambient levels of harmful pollutants by
lowering emissions from trucks and buses on the roads. The EPA also assumed
that truck and bus emissions in use would decrease when new engines met
lower levels of emissions under the laboratory tests. These assumptions came to
be starkly questioned in the mid-1990s in the context of the EPA's regulation
of NOx emissions from heavy-duty diesel truck engines. The saga of the EPA's
major enforcement action against the manufacturers of these engines offers
insight into performance standards' own performance "in action."
140. See 45 Fed. Reg. 4136, supra note 107, at 4147.
141. See 44 Fed. Reg. 9464, supra note 102.
142. See 45 Fed. Reg. 4136, supra note 107, at 4139.
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A. The Political Economy of Diesel Emissions
Under the Clean Air Act and its subsequent amendments, the federal
government has taken a classic performance-based approach to mobile source
emissions. For each vehicle model (or, in the case of diesels, each engine type),
manufacturers must submit results from testing that complies with the testing
protocol. Only vehicles that meet the standards under the test can be sold,
which the EPA declares by issuing a certificate of conformity. In addition,
several broader features of the Clean Air Act played a role in the political
economy behind the EPA's efforts to target manufacturers of heavy-duty diesel
engines for enforcement action. Given the way the Clean Air Act is structured,
tough enforcement of the EPA's NOx performance standards would not only
deliver cleaner air to the public, but would also deliver a windfall to the many
regulated stationary sources of air pollution located across the United States.43
For these reasons, state governments pressured the EPA to target NOx
emissions from diesel engines.
Central to the Clean Air Act's regulatory structure are federal ambient air
quality standards for six "criteria" pollutants (i.e., carbon monoxide, lead, NOx,
ozone, particulates, and sulfur dioxide). No individual or business is directly
regulated by these NAAQS, but they play a key role in driving much of the air
pollution regulation that does impinge on industry across the country.'4
The federal EPA both sets the NAAQS and establishes and enforces
emissions standards for new motor vehicles. It is then up to the states to find
ways to bring the air within their borders to levels at or below federal ambient
standards. States seek to do so by developing state implementation plans (SIPs)
that detail how they will regulate new and existing stationary sources-that is,
factories and other industrial plants.145 The federal EPA must regularly review
and approve SIPs, but the binding regulatory limits imposed on stationary
sources emanate from state law, enacted in accordance with each SIP, not
federal regulation.
Air sampling is used to determine if states' air quality meets the NAAQS.
Those states that do not meet their NAAQS must implement various
143. Andrew Morriss and his co-authors helpfully connect the EPA's regulation of
diesel emissions to the various features of the Clean Air Act discussed in this part. See Morriss et al.,
supra note 57, at 408-20.
144. For a discussion of the structure of air pollution regulation in the United States,
see J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING
THE SYSTEM (1998); and PAUL PORTNEY & ROBERT STAVINS, PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION (2000). As should now be clear, the relationship between ambient air quality standards and
mobile source emissions standards is not one-to-one. The EPA does regulate carbon monoxide, NOx,
and particulates emissions from mobile sources. But it does not directly regulate ozone emissions;
instead, it regulates emissions of hydrocarbons, which, along with NOx, are precursors to ozone. It has
not addressed sulfur dioxide or lead through mobile source emissions standards as much as through fuel
content standards.
145. SIPs can include as well some measures aimed at reducing emissions from
mobile sources, such as carpooling incentives or automobile inspection and maintenance programs.
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supplemental controls in future SIPs or they face the threat of sanctions,
including the theoretical possibility of a federal takeover of stationary source
regulation within their borders.
Emissions from mobile sources obviously factor into states' air quality,
and yet ambient air sampling does not (and cannot) distinguish between
emissions from mobile or stationary sources. Since the adequacy of any SIP's
control of stationary sources can only be determined by air samples that include
pollution from both stationary and mobile sources, the EPA uses information
from its vehicle testing program to develop computer models that factor out the
pollution that mobile sources contribute. As such, the accuracy of the EPA's
testing protocol not only matters for determining whether classes of new
vehicles or engines can be sold, but also holds direct implications for the EPA's
conclusions about states' progress toward meeting their air quality goals. If the
EPA's estimates of mobile source emissions are too high, states and the EPA
will inaccurately infer that SIPs are more effective than they actually are in
addressing stationary sources. Conversely, if the EPA's estimates for mobile
sources are too low, the EPA will assume that states' efforts to control pollution
from the sources over which they have jurisdiction are much less effective than
they actually are.
When it comes to controlling NOx emissions, these various factors of the
Clean Air Act made diesel NOx emissions an attractive target for enforcement
scrutiny. Despite the progress the nation had made on many pollution
problems, by the 1990s, many parts of the country continued to experience
nonattainment with the EPA's ozone NAAQS. Many eastern states raised
particular concerns about the contributions of the transboundary movement of
air pollution to their nonattainment status. In 1995, the EPA entered into a
collaborative process with a group of states and various industry and
environmental organizations, known collectively as the Ozone Transport
Assessment Group (OTAG). In July 1997, the OTAG process generated a
series of recommendations to guide future EPA air policy, including one urging
the EPA to consider ways to reduce NOx emissions from diesel engines.'4 6 In a
separate action, at virtually the same time, the EPA issued more stringent
NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter, increasing the number of areas that
were in nonattainment status.147
Since NOx is both a precursor to ozone and a key byproduct from diesel
combustion, the EPA's revisions to its ambient ozone standard raised the stakes
146. See Letter from the Ozone Transport Assessment Group to Mary Nichols,
Assistant Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (July 8, 1997), http://archive.epa.gov/ttn/ozone/web/
pdf/otagappb.pdf; see also Larry Parker & John Blodgett, Air Quality and the New Ozone NAAQS: The
OTAG Process, ENV'T & NAT. RESOURCE POL'Y DIVISION (July 30, 1998), http://digital.library.unt.edu/
govdocs/crs/permalinkl/meta-crs-522: 1.
147. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856,
38,652 (July 18, 1997).
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for states and regulated industrial operations to ensure that the EPA's law of the
test for diesel emissions was robustly and accurately enforced.
The EPA had ample motivation to target diesel engine manufacturers. As
a narrow, concentrated industry, the diesel engine manufacturers could be
targeted without generating nearly the same kind of resistance that could be
expected to accompany actions against other sectors. Moreover, for years,
questions had swirled around the EPA's diesel engine testing protocol and
whether it formed an accurate basis for estimating truck and bus contributions
to overall NOx emissions (and thereby to the total ambient ozone problem).4 8
If it could be shown that the EPA's testing protocol systematically
underestimated the actual emissions coming from mobile sources, then fixing
the error would mean that states could reap a near-instant "credit" toward the
stationary sources they need to control in their SIPs. The burden on states to
reduce air pollution from the sources over which they had authority would be
reduced, and stationary sources would face fewer state regulatory demands to
lower further their pollution of the ambient air.
B. EPA's Enforcement Action and Its Settlement
When crafting its NOx emissions standards in the 1980s and early 1990s,
the EPA did not take into account a significant change in truck engine design
that occurred in the 1990s: the advent of electronic engine controls. With these
controls, manufacturers were able to program their engines so they could sense
when they were outside the conditions specified in the transient test. For
example, the transient test replicates the speeds and torques of a truck operating
on urban streets and highways in Los Angeles and New York. Using electronic
engine controls, manufacturers programmed their engines to meet the EPA's
emissions standard for those prescribed intervals. But after that time, the
engines operated so as to maximize power and fuel economy, notwithstanding
an increase in NOx emissions.
This change proved important for the ultimate customers of diesels-
truckers and the owners of trucking companies-who have a particularly strong
economic interest in fuel economy. A difference of just one-tenth of one mile
per gallon can influence a trucker's engine purchasing choice.4 9 Driven by the
goal of increasing sales, diesel engine manufacturers responded by seeking to
meet the transient test procedure in a way that maximized fuel economy. The
148. See Morriss et al., supra note 57, at 415-17; Janet Yanowitz et al., Prediction of
In-Use Emissions of Heavy-Duty Diesel Vehicles from Engine Testing, 36 ENVTL. SC. & TECH. 270
(2002).
149. See Success Story - Martin Transport, MACK TRUCKS INC. (Oct. 7, 2010)
(modified Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.macklabornegotiations.com/assets/mack/css/images/5191.pdf
(quoting trucking company vice president as explaining that his company purchased new trucks during
the recession because "a savings of one-tenth of one mile per gallon of diesel fuel equates to
approximately $300,000 per year.").
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EPA certified these engines as compliant because emissions were within the
acceptable range when manufacturers tested them.
Exactly when and how the EPA learned that manufacturers were
designing engines to maximize power and fuel economy outside the transient
test cycle remains unclear. A March 2000 staff report prepared by the U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Commerce found that the EPA had
knowledge of this strategy as early as 1991.150 In a 1994 notice of proposed
rulemaking, agency officials had indicated that they were aware that some
manufacturers were using "transient sensing algorithms that ha[d] the effect of
retarding the timing during transient engine operating conditions and advancing
the timing during certain steady state operating conditions. '5 ' It was not until
July 1998, however, that the EPA decided to bring enforcement actions against
what were then the seven leading diesel engine manufacturers.
In filing its actions in court, the EPA argued that designing engines that
produced excessive NOx outside the parameters of the transient test constituted
a "defeat device," which is prohibited under the Clean Air Act. 52 The EPA
estimated that, in 1998 alone, engines made by the targeted manufacturers
produced 1.3 million tons of excess NOx emissions, a large portion of overall
nationwide NOx emissions for that year.1 53 Because truck engines can last for
decades, the amount of excess emissions that these engines generated over their
lifetimes was perhaps in the range of tens of millions of tons.
The EPA had leverage over the engine manufacturers, as the agency had
yet to issue final certificates of conformity for the manufacturers' engines for
the upcoming year. With that kind of leverage against them, the manufacturers
swiftly entered into a settlement with the agency in just a matter of months.
However, the manufacturers never conceded that they had broken the law or
created defeat devices. On the contrary, they claimed to have built engines that
met the agency's own testing protocol, using methods of adjusting fuel
injection that the agency had long accepted.54 Nevertheless, with certificates of
conformity hanging in the balance, they agreed to pay $83 million, which
amounted to the largest settlement of an enforcement action that the EPA had
ever collected. In addition, manufacturers agreed to produce engines that
achieved a NOx emission standard of 2.5 g/BHP-hr by October 2002, a 50%
reduction over the preexisting federal standard.
150. See Asleep at the Wheel, supra note 10, at 6.
151. Approval and Promulgation of State and Federal Implementation Plans;
California- Sacramento and Ventura Ozone; South Coast Ozone and Carbon Monoxide; Sacramento
Ozone Area Reclassification, 59 Fed. Reg. 23,264, 23,418 (May 5, 1994).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 7522(a)(3)(B); see also 40 C.F.R. Part 86, Subpart A.
153. See DOJ, EPA Announce One Billion Dollar Settlement with Diesel Engine
Industry for Clean Air Violations, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (Oct. 22, 1998), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/
pr/1998/October/499_enr.htm.
154. See Mike Osenga, Diesel Industry Confronts the Emissions Settlement, DIESEL
PROGRESS 42 (Dec. 1998).
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Significantly, six of the seven manufacturers also agreed to submit their
engines to supplemental emissions testing procedures beyond the existing
transient test. These new testing procedures were designed to make up for
limitations in the existing transient test that had allowed the excess emissions to
go undetected for so long. The new testing procedure was called "not-to-
exceed" because it emphasized an upper limit on the amount of emissions that
could be released during the test, which restricted the variance around average
emissions rather than measuring the average alone (as the other tests did). By
October 2002, the EPA had certified that engines manufactured by each of the
seven companies that signed a consent agreement had achieved required
emissions reductions in accordance with the not-to-exceed testing procedure.
Through a process that legal scholar Andrew Morriss and his co-authors
have termed "regulation by litigation, '155 the EPA sought to require the seven
targeted manufacturers to pull ahead of the rest of the industry by meeting more
stringent pollution requirements. Since the manufacturers "voluntarily"
accepted these more stringent standards in order to settle the agency's
enforcement action, the EPA was able to circumvent the normal rulemaking
process while binding the manufacturers to a much tighter time frame for
compliance than it would otherwise have been permitted to impose if it had
used the normal regulatory process.156
C. The Testing Protocol Revisited
The EPA's lawsuit against the diesel manufacturers and the consent
decrees it filed in 1998 made clear the limitations of the EPA's transient testing
protocol that took effect in 1985. As noted, the manufacturers covered by the
consent decree were required to adopt additional testing procedures, namely a
supplemental steady-state test and the "not-to-exceed" protocol.57 According
to a new regulation the EPA adopted in 2000, all manufacturers would become
subject to those same testing requirements starting in 2007.158
Like the steady-state test the EPA relied on until 1984, the supplemental
steady-state test the EPA required as part of the 1998 consent decree required
manufacturers to test emissions at specified speeds and loads. The
supplemental test would represent driving conditions not covered in the
transient test-in particular, highway cruise speeds and loads.159 The EPA's test
155. See Morriss et al., supra note 57. For a broader discussion of "regulation by
litigation," see W. KIP VISCUSI, REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (2002).
156. For a critical account of this approach, see JAMES V. DELONG, OUT OF BOUNDS
AND OUT OF CONTROL: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA (2002).
157. Notice of Filing of Consent Decree Under the Clean Air Act, 63 Fed. Reg.
59,330 (Nov. 3, 1998).
158. See Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from 2004 and Later Model Year
Heavy-Duty Highway Engines and Vehicles; Revision of Light-Duty On-Board Diagnostics
Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 59,896 (Oct. 6, 2000).
159. See id. at 59,915.
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procedure detailed the speeds and loads it expected manufacturers to test. In
addition, it reserved the opportunity to select three additional test points, which
it would not disclose to manufacturers until immediately prior to the test.
According to the EPA, those requirements would ensure "that emissions do not
'peak' outside of the 13-mode test points.' 60
The EPA further proposed the "not-to-exceed" test. Unlike the transient
test, not-to-exceed does not specify a driving cycle. Instead, this test establishes
an engine operating zone that approximates "any engine operation conditions
that could reasonably be expected to be seen by that engine in normal vehicle
operation and use."'16 ' Unlike the transient test, the not-to-exceed test is not
limited to a particular length of time or to driving conditions similar to what
would be found in New York or Los Angeles. It is meant to include all normal
driving situations with the exception of very low speeds and low loads and very
high speeds and low loads. Because not-to-exceed testing encompasses uch a
wide range of conditions, the EPA allowed manufacturers to meet a less
stringent standard emissions standard when following this protocol. In a final
rule adopted in October 2000, the EPA established that, under the not-to-
exceed procedure, emissions could not exceed 1.25 times the applicable
transient test standard.
62
In addition to these changes, in 2000, the EPA announced a major
innovation on the horizon: in-use testing. The EPA finalized its in-use testing
program in detail in 2005 ,163 after in-use testing became possible with the
development of "portable emissions measurement systems" (PEMSs). PEMSs
are about the size of a large suitcase, mounted inside or outside the cab of a
truck. The PEMSs available today measure gaseous pollutants: non-methane
hydrocarbons, CO, NOx, and particulates.64
On-board, in-use testing now makes it possible for the EPA to assess
environmental performance over the course of a vehicle's life. According to the
program structure, the EPA selects a certain number of diesel engine "families"
to be tested, which comprise about 25% of a manufacturer's fleet in any given
year.65 These tests are not conducted on new engines or vehicles, but vehicles
in operation. The engine manufacturers must find truck drivers who are willing
to volunteer to participate in the on-board testing program. Each vehicle is then
equipped with a PEMS. Its regular operator drives the truck on a regular route
hauling a regular load. Manufacturers must then report test results to the EPA,
160. Id. at 59,916.
161. fd. at 59,911.
162. See Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from 2004 and Later Model Year
Heavy-Duty Highway Engines and Vehicles; Revision of Light-Duty On-Board Diagnostics
Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 59,896, 59,930 (Oct. 6, 2000).
163. See Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: In-Use
Testing for Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines and Vehicles, 70 Fed. Reg. 34,594 (June 14, 2005) [hereinafter
70 Fed. Reg. 34,594].
164. ld. at 34,611.
165. See id. at 34,598.
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including all emissions data, engine operating parameters, test conditions, test
equipment specifications, and vehicle and engine information generated during
the test.166
Manufacturers are required to test 5 to 10 vehicles from each engine type
or "family." '67 If at least 5 out of 6 vehicles in a family achieve "a specified
vehicle pass criteria," no further testing is required for that family. 68 If more
than one vehicle fails, the manufacturer must test all 10 vehicles and achieve a
pass rate of 8 out of 10. If that rate is not achieved, the EPA may require
additional testing.169
The results obtained from in-use tests are not fully equivalent to results
from laboratory tests. Because a portable emissions measurement system is not
as finely calibrated as a laboratory measurement device, error rates can differ
between the two methods of measurement. The PEMSs fold up into a suitcase
and can cost about $100,000 to $180,000, while the analytical instrumentation
for a laboratory measurement system can fill a trailer and reportedly cost in the
range of $300,000 to $500,000-a price difference reflecting the laboratory
equipment's greater precision .170 As part of a settlement of a legal challenge to
an earlier rule, the engine manufacturers, the EPA, and the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) agreed to a "measurement allowance" of .45 g/BHP-
hr for PEMSs, meaning that, when the EPA determines compliance, it must
subtract that amount from the emissions results obtained from PEMSs.
171
D. Tightening Standards After Litigation
In 2000, the EPA initiated a rulemaking that would make major changes
to its emissions standards for heavy-duty diesel engines. The agency estimated
that, by 2007, emissions from diesel trucks would account for nearly 30% of
NOx emissions and 14% of particulate emissions from all transportation
sources. 172 By this time, the health risks and environmental consequences
166. See id. at 34,607 (June 14, 2005); see also Off. of Transp. & Air Quality, In-Use
Testing Program for Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines and Vehicles, Technical Support Document, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (June 2005), http://www3.epa.gov/otaq/highway-diesel/regs/420r05006.
pdf.
167. See 70 Fed. Reg. 34,594, supra note 163, at 34,601.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Off. of Transp. & Air Quality, supra note 166, at 2. This estimate comes
from a phone interview we conducted with an official from U.S. EPA Office of Transportation and Air
Quality Assessment and Standards Division.
171. See Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles; Emission
Measurement Accuracy Margins for Portable Emission Measurement Systems and Program Revisions,
73 Fed. Reg. 13,441 (Mar. 13, 2008); Test Plan To Determine PEMS Measurement Allowance for the
PM Emissions Regulated Under the Manufacturer-Run Heavy-Duty Diesel Engine In-Use Testing
Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (2010), http://www3.epa.gov/otaq/regs/hd-hwy/inuse/
420b10901 .pdf.
172. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Proposed Heavy-Duty
Engine and Vehicle Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg.
35,434 (June 2, 2000) [hereinafter 65 Fed. Reg. 35,434].
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associated with both of these pollutants had become much better established.173
The EPA also noted the growing popularity of diesels, calling these engines "a
vital workhorse in the United States, moving much of the nation's freight, and
carrying out much of its farm, construction, and other labor. 174 The agency
estimated that about one million new diesel engines were being brought into
service each year.175 The harmful nature of diesel emissions, combined with the
rapidly growing use of diesels, motivated the EPA to take further action.
The EPA finalized its more stringent emissions standards in 2001: a
particulate standard of 0.01 g/BHP-hr, an NOx standard of 0.2 g/BHP-hr, and a
non-methane hydrocarbon standard of 0.14 g/BHP-hr, each taking effect
beginning in 2007.176 For NOx, the proposed standard represented roughly a
90% emissions reduction compared to the previous standards that took effect in
2004. Figure 2 summarizes the progression of federal standards for NOx and
particulates during the period from 1990 to 2007.
The EPA anticipated that manufacturers would need to use "after-
treatment devices" to meet these new standards. Until this point, manufacturers
had reduced emissions mainly by changing engine operating characteristics.
The new NOx standards would likely require manufacturers to install NOx
adsorbers that would capture NOx after combustion but before being released
into exhaust.177 Unfortunately, sulfur in diesel fuel can "poison" NOx
adsorbers, so in conjunction with tightening emissions limits, the EPA also
limited the sulfur content in diesel fuel sold to consumers to 15 parts per
million beginning in 2007, a 97% reduction.78
As the EPA set its more stringent emissions standards and established
more demanding testing protocols, another factor entered the picture that
served to undercut the actual impact of the EPA's performance standards:
consumers. According to Standard & Poor's estimates, trucks with engines
meeting the EPA's 2007 emissions requirements cost 5% more to buy and
turned out to be 2% less fuel efficient.1 79 Customers were also uncertain about
the reliability of the new engines, a crucial consideration given that many truck
operators work under tight time schedules, with tight profit margins and limited
fleet sizes. Trucks powered by engines that are substantially different from
those that operators have worked with in the past represented a significant risk
173. See supra Part II.
174. See 65 Fed. Reg. 35,434, supra note 172, at 35,436.
175. See id.
176. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and
Vehicle Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 5005 (Jan. 18,
2001).
177. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and
Vehicle Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5048-52
(Jan. 18, 2001).
178. See id.
179. See Fiore, supra note 87.
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Figure 2: U.S. EPA Standards for NOx and Particulates
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of business interruption and failure to meet shipping deadlines.180 As a result,
customers were skittish and reluctant to wait to buy new trucks after 2007.
Industry sales figures indicate that consumers "pre-bought" trucks in order to
take advantage of lower-cost, more fuel-efficient, tried-and-true models,
despite their poorer emissions performance. Demand for trucks equipped with
heavy-duty diesel engines increased by 25% in 2005 and 12% in 2006, and
sales in 2006 reached an all-time high of 410,000.181 Standard & Poor's
reported that sales of heavy-duty trucks "declined sharply"-by 66%-for the
two years following the effective date of the EPA's new testing protocols. 82
Given that the useful life of a heavy-duty diesel engine is over 400,000
miles, 1 83 trucks that were pre-bought before 2007 have stayed on the road-and
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See Jim Corridore, Industry Surveys: Heavy Equipment and Trucks, S&P
CAPITAL IQ (Jan. 2015), https://gskkr.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/heavy-equipment-and-trucks.pdf.
The sales drop-off was not permanent. Starting in 2010, however, sales started to rebound, largely "to
replace aging equipment." Id.
183. See Off. of Transp. & Air Quality, Development of Heavy-Duty On-Highway
Engine Regulations in the U.S., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (June 9, 2014),
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some may even continue to stay on the road-for quite a number of years,
delaying the benefits of the EPA's new rules.84 Furthermore, as trucks age,
they are used less for long-haul highway driving and more for short-haul urban
driving. Rural areas were probably the first to experience the benefits of the
EPA's new heavy-duty diesel engine emission rules, while urban areas (which
have the more serious air pollution problems) may have experienced dirtier air
for a longer time due to how many pre-2007 trucks remained in use.'85
E. Volkswagen in the Blind Spot
We can now fast-forward to the scandal involving Volkswagen's diesel
cars, which unfolded in a manner strikingly similar to the saga of heavy-duty
truck engines. Although the Volkswagen story is still unfolding-with the
company embroiled in litigation and under investigation by regulatory
authorities in the U.S. and Europe-it is clear that the government's
performance tests were not up to the task of ensuring that actual emissions
matched those reflected in the law of the test. Despite the EPA's experience
with the heavy-duty diesel engine industry, the agency had never established an
in-use testing protocol for diesel automobiles.8 6 As a result, Volkswagen cars
passed the regulators' laboratory emissions tests but then emitted substantially
higher levels of NOx on the road.
It only took a few researchers at West Virginia University, working under
contract for the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), to
uncover the Volkswagen scandal. ICCT, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization
headquartered in the United States, works to promote environmental
improvement in the transportation sector by conducting independent research.
In 2012, ICCT submitted a proposal to the European Commission asking the
Commission to fund a study of the in-use emissions performance of diesel-
powered cars, with the aim not of uncovering deception but rather to find out if
automobile manufacturers could meet more stringent regulatory targets.
87
After its proposal was denied,88 the organization decided to fund a smaller
http://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/5.%2ODevelopment%20of%2OHDOH%2OEngine%2ORegulati
ons%20in%20US%20_Orehowsky.pdf; see also 61 Fed. Reg. 33,421, supra note 85.
184. See Morriss et al., supra note 57.
185. See id.
186. See Jack Ewing, Researchers Who Exposed VW Gain Little Reward from
Success, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/25/business/vw-wvu-diesel-
volkswagen-west-virginia.html (discussing the "significant engineering challenge" associated with
testing emissions from automobiles on the road).
187. See FAQ: In-Use NOx Emissions from Diesel Passenger Cars, INT'L COUNCIL
ON CLEAN TRANSP. (Sept. 25, 2015) [hereinafter INT'L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP.],
http://www.theicct.org/news/faq-use-nox-emissions-diesel-passenger-cars; Ewing, supra note 186.
188. See INT'L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP., supra note 187.
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version of the project out of its own organizational budget-which is,
incidentally, less than one-tenth of one percent the size of the EPA's budget.18 9
ICCT selected West Virginia University's Center for Alternative Fuels,
Engines and Emissions (CAFEE) to conduct in-use tests on three vehicles.'
90 In
2013, CAFEE's researchers rented two diesel cars and borrowed a third: two
Volkswagen models (Jetta and Passat) and one BMW (X5).' 9' All three were
certified as meeting EPA and California emissions standards; all had relatively
low mileage; and all checked out satisfactorily, with no signs of any
malfunctioning engine or after-treatment parts.192 The three cars were then
equipped with a PEMS and driven through five established test routes in
Southern California, with each route representing different driving conditions
(e.g., city traffic, highways, and hills). 193 The Volkswagen Passat was also
driven from Southern California to Seattle and back.194
CAFEE found that the two Volkswagen models emitted NOx emissions
higher than the levels reflected in the regulatory standards: the Jetta emitted 15
to 35 times the applicable EPA standard, while the Passat emitted 5 to 20 times
the standard.95 The BMW model, by contrast, kept emissions to levels below
the standard on all but the steepest of the routes.'
96 When the researchers took
the two Volkswagen models to CARB's emissions testing laboratory and had
the regulatory tests run on the two cars, their NOx emissions were below the
mandatory limit.' 97
Following the release of the CAFEE study in May 2014, regulators at
CARB and the EPA began their own investigation. During that time,
Volkswagen representatives allegedly "continued to assert to CARB and the
EPA that the increased emissions from these vehicles could be attributed to
various technical issues and unexpected in-use conditions."'98 The company
189. See Audited Consolidated Financial Statements (2013), INT'L COUNCIL ON
CLEAN TRANSP., http://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/2013 ICCTAFS.pdf; see also EPA's Budget
and Spending, U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY (last visited Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.epa.gov/
planandbudget/budget.
190. See INT'L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP., supra note 187; see also Ewing, supra
note 186.
191. See INT'L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP., supra note 187; see also Ewing, supra
note 186.
192. See Gregory J. Thompson et al., In-Use Emissions Testing of Light-Duty Diesel




194. See id.; INT'L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP., supra note 187.
195. See Thompson et al., supra note 192, at 62-63; INT'L COUNCIL ON CLEAN
TRANSP., supra note 187.
196. See Thompson et al., supra note 192, at 63; INT'L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP.,
supra note 187.
197. See Thompson et al., supra note 192, at 64; INT'L COUNCIL ON CLEAN TRANSP.,
supra note 187.
198. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Notice of Violation to Volkswagen (Sept. 18, 2015),
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015- 10/documents/vw-nov-caa-09-18-15.pdf.
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issued a voluntary recall in December 2014, but subsequent esting by CARB
failed to convince the regulators that the issue had been solved. 99 CARB and
the EPA threatened to hold up certification of Volkswagen's 2016 model year
cars. According to the EPA, "[o]nly then did VW admit it had designed and
installed a defeat device in these vehicles in the form of a sophisticated
algorithm that detected when a vehicle was undergoing emissions testing.
' 200
Volkswagen had installed some kind of a digital system on its vehicles that
automatically detected when the vehicle was in normal use and when it was
connected to a testing machine, and then alternated the calibration of the engine
accordingly. Apparently, the system was so accurately designed that, when
connected to laboratory testing equipment, it automatically switched to the
"normal," non-testing mode precisely one second after the time period called
for in the EPA's testing protocol. °1
In September 2015, CARB and the EPA released formal notices of
violation, asserting that Volkswagen had installed defeat devices in hundreds of
thousands of its vehicles, across seven models from 2009 to 2015.202
Researchers at MIT and Harvard estimated that the excess emissions from this
initial set of 482,000 identified vehicles could contribute to 60 to 130
premature fatalities nationwide. °3 CARB and the EPA also announced they
would conduct additional testing of other vehicles. By November 2015,
following further testing, the two regulatory agencies issued another notice of
violation covering seven more Volkswagen models from 2014 to 2016.204 In
January 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a civil action in federal
district court on behalf of the EPA against Volkswagen, seeking what could
have amounted to up to nearly $50 billion in statutory penalties.0 5 The
government charged Volkswagen with installing defeat devices in
approximately 580,000 vehicles and accused the company of concealing
information and making "affirmative misrepresentations" to government
regulators.0 6 In June 2016, the automaker agreed to a partial settlement of this
suit for approximately $15 billion.20 7
199. See id.
200. ld. at 4.
201. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Notice of Violation to Volkswagen 4 (Nov. 2,
2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015- 11/documents/vw-nov-2015-11-02.pdf
202. See id. Included among the models was the Audi A3. Audi is owned by
Volkswagen.
203. Steven R.H. Barrett et al., Impact of the Volkswagen Emissions Control Defeat
Device on US Public Health, 10 ENVT'L REs. LETrERS (2015).
204. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 201. The notice of violation was also
sent to Porsche, which is owned by Volkswagen.
205. The complaint was filed against Volkswagen AG, Audi AG, Volkswagen Group
of America, Volkswagen Group of America Chattanooga Operations, Porsche AG, and Porsche Cars
North America, which are collectively referred to in this paragraph's discussion of the complaint as
"Volkswagen." Complaint, United States v. Volkswagen, 2016 U.S. Dist. (D. Mich. 2016) (No.
2:16cv10006).
206. Id. Worldwide, Volkswagen has acknowledged that as many as 11 million of its
vehicles have had their emissions outputs managed by these same kinds of defeat devices. See William
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The swift, responsive regulatory action that the EPA and CARB have
taken following the ICCT study's release has been laudable. Yet the
Volkswagen scandal is revelatory about what might have been done differently,
perhaps even seven years earlier. Not only did it cost ICCT only $70,000 to
identify the disparity in on-road emissions in the first place, but the speed at
which CARB and the EPA subsequently identified the broader problems
suggests the relative ease of detecting the scandal.2 °8 Granted, CARB and the
EPA have a sweeping set of other responsibilities and finite resources, but
having encountered similar methods with heavy-duty diesel truck engine
manufacturers in the 1990s, it should have hardly come as any surprise that
diesel car manufacturers might want to approach the inherent tradeoffs in
diesel technology in similar ways. Indeed, it should come as no surprise
because performance standards facilitate, if not encourage, regulated firms to
proceed in such fashion: namely, to meet the law of the test, but to do so in
ways that yield private advantages, even at the expense of societal welfare.
IV. Lessons for Performance-Based Regulation
Although commentators have sometimes suggested that a performance-
based environmental regulation would be difficult to effectuate because it
would require government officials "to do hard things that they have never
been willing to do before,"2"9 the history of the EPA's regulation of heavy-duty
diesel engine emissions clearly shows that government has actually been quite
willing to rely on performance standards for many decades, at least in the
automobile emissions context. The EPA established goals for engine
manufacturers to meet-specifying a designated test with emissions levels
below the stated standards, but not mandating that manufacturers use any
particular means to meet that goal. The EPA's accumulated experience with
performance standards in this area could offer useful insights for decision
makers at the EPA and elsewhere who find themselves facing choices about
whether to use a performance-based approach.
What lessons can be drawn from the EPA's regulatory history with diesel
engine emissions? In this part, we conclude by adding to the larger literature on
regulatory instrument choice a series of what should by now be evident
limitations of performance standards. The heavy-duty diesel engine emissions
Boston & Sarah Sloat, Volkswagen Emissions Scandal Relates to 11 Million Cars, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagen-emissions-scandal-relates-to-Il-million-cars-14429
16906.
207. See U.S. DEP'T JUST., supra note 7. The settlement covers 2.0-liter engine model
cars, but still outstanding are civil charges concerning 3.0-liter models. The Justice Department has also
made clear that criminal charges have not yet been ruled out. Id.
208. Reportedly it cost the West Virginia University researchers up to an additional
$20,000 or $30,000, funded by other sources, to conduct the study. See Ewing, supra note 186.
209. OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY,
AND IMPLEMENTATION 147 (1999) (discussing the challenges states faced in implementing a
performance-based approach to water quality).
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saga helps clarify what is realistic to expect from a move to a more fully
performance-based approach to regulation in the realm of environmental policy
or other policy areas. Obviously, appropriate caution is always in order when
generalizing from a single case study. We do not claim that performance
standards will always or even typically operate as they have here. Indeed, as we
have discussed in other work, not all performance standards are the same. How
they are designed-the degree of specificity that they provide about the desired
outcome, the closeness between the outcome specified in the standard and the
outcome of ultimate concern to the regulator (and to society), the way that
performance is measured, and the basis for the standard (e.g., risk versus
feasibility) -can affect how they will operate in practice21"
Still, this case study offers a meaningful advance in our understanding of
performance standards, especially because, as we have previously noted, there
exists an "absence of empirical studies ... showing when, where, and how well
performance standards work."'21 This absence has been all the more striking
given the widespread acceptance of the superiority of performance standards,
which we discussed in Part I. Unlike one-size-fits-all means standards,
performance standards bring with them greater compliance flexibility, offering
the theoretical possibility of greater cost-effectiveness. In the absence of
retrospective research on performance standards, the conventional wisdom's
unbridled enthusiasm for these standards has rested almost exclusively on
theory and intuition. A single case study, then, can help either to corroborate
the conventional wisdom or to caution against accepting it unconditionally. The
latter is what we conclude from this case study of diesel emissions control. If
nothing else, this case study reveals how the theoretical case usually advanced
in favor of performance standards must be tempered with an understanding of
how these standards actually operate in practice and what challenges they
present to regulators for their effective implementation.
A. Limits to Performance Standards
Performance is integral to any regulatory system, as any given regulatory
strategy will always need to be assessed in terms of its performance in
achieving the regulators' desired outcomes and any other relevant criteria, such
as costs. Notwithstanding the widespread acclaim for performance standards
noted in Part I, their ultimate success, like that of any other approach to
regulation, depends on the quality and quantity of the performance that they
achieve.
The experience with performance standards for heavy-duty diesel
emissions brings to the fore several key limitations and challenges to
performance standards that have been too seldom recognized in the literature
210. See also Coglianese et al., supra note 24, at 709-11.
211. Id. at 714.
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on regulatory instruments. These limitations raise the question of whether it
makes sense to treat performance standards as "generally superior" to means
standards."2 The full recognition of the limitations and challenges illustrated
with the EPA's experience regulating diesel emissions should lead
policymakers to be more cautious before accepting overly broad, unqualified,
and glowingly positive generalizations about performance-based regulation.1 3
In contrast with the prevailing enthusiasm in the literature, the EPA's
experience with diesel emissions regulation offers seven counterbalancing
lessons about a performance-based approach to environmental regulation.1 4
1. Performance standards can sometimes generate problematic
"teaching-to-the-test" responses. The behavior of diesel engine manufacturers
in the face of regulatory demands reveals an obvious but insufficiently
acknowledged problem with performance standards: gaming the system. In the
field of education, gaming like this is referred to as "teaching to the test.21 5
This phenomenon need not be at all malicious or ill intentioned. Teachers
acting in good faith may teach their students techniques needed to score high
on tests, but those students may nevertheless fail to internalize fully the
underlying knowledge and cognitive skills that the tests seek to measure. Just
as with students taking tests in the classroom, businesses in a regulated sector
may satisfy the regulators' tests but fail to satisfy completely the regulators'
underlying purpose. Performance standards not only are vulnerable to this
problem, but they even seem to invite it. After all, the chief advantage cited in
defense of these standards lies in their flexibility. Firms are permitted, if not
entirely encouraged, to find ways to meet a designated outcome that will align
better with their own self-interests. Indeed, sometimes the methods that firms
use to meet mandated outcomes may not align as well with the public interests
that the regulation is supposed to serve. As with teachers who teach to the test,
the behavior of firms need not be blameworthy; after all, they are just seeking
to do what the law requires-pass the test-while also achieving other lawful
objectives, such as minimizing costs or satisfying consumers' preferences.
Some might argue that what the diesel engine manufacturers did
amounted to cheating. That would have clearly been the case had the
manufacturers tried to pass their emissions tests by doctoring records or bribing
engineers running the test so they would fudge the test results. This would be
just as if teachers gave students the answers to tests, or if, after administering
exams, teachers erased incorrect answers and filled them in with correct ones -
212. OTRA, supra note 19, at 8.
213. As economist Kip Viscusi has noted, it would be "an oversimplification to claim
that [performance standards] are always preferable." W. KIP VISCUSi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING
HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE 129 (1983).
214. A similar list upon which this section of the article draws, but which also uses
some other examples, can be found at Coglianese, supra note 31.
215. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Jennings & Jonathan Marc Bearak, "Teaching to the Test"
in the NCLB Era: How Test Predictability Affects Our Understanding of Student Performance, 43
EDUC. RESEARCHER 381 (2014).
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behavior that has been shown to have occurred with high-stakes educational
testing.21 6 Nothing of this sort appears to have occurred when it came to passing
the diesel engine emissions tests, and that kind of cheating is not at all what we
mean by "teaching to the test." We mean behavior that aims for passing a
required test, and does legitimately pass it, but that nevertheless fails to fulfill
the larger purpose behind that test.
With the EPA's regulation of heavy-duty diesel engine emissions, the
agency established a test and required that engine manufacturers pass it. The
manufacturers did just that. No one ever disputed that the manufacturers built
engines that satisfied the EPA's tests. The government's claim in its lawsuit
was instead that the manufacturers had "complied" in a way that skirted the
overarching regulatory goal of reducing actual NOx emissions from trucks on
the roads, that the onboard programming constituted a prohibited "defeat
device.21 7 Yet viewed from another perspective, what the diesel engine
manufacturers did was simply satisfy the NOx test while still meeting other
market demands facing the firms. Presumably, this is just what these same
manufacturers are doing now, even after the consent decree. At least, that is
what scholars and policy leaders have trumpeted as the theoretical advantage of
performance standards.2 18
For the manufacturers of heavy-duty diesel engines, the only difference
today is that they are facing a new testing protocol. This testing protocol is
surely not perfect, and neither government officials nor the public should be
surprised if some manufacturers find a way to meet the new testing protocol in
a way that delivers value to their private interests (and those of their customers)
at some sacrifice to the broader public interest in environmental protection.
This possibility of a kind of shirking or gaming behavior is inherent in the
discretion afforded by performance standards. Recognizing this reality is not, of
course, to say that performance standards should never be used. It is to say,
216. See Alan Blinder, Atlanta Educators Convicted in School Cheating Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/us/verdict-reached-in-atlanta-school-
testing-trial .html.
217. Some in the industry have claimed that they did meet the EPA's original goal, but
that the EPA expanded its goals in the wake of numerous states facing nonattainment status for ozone
after 1997. Since the original transient test mainly simulated urban driving patterns, the manufacturers
might well be excused for thinking that the EPA's goal was to reduce NOx emissions in cities-where
ozone is most pronounced. That the engine's operating parameters shifted under highway conditions-
when presumably the trucks and buses would be out of urban areas -arguably did not conflict at all with
the goal of protecting urban air quality. In this regard, it is interesting to note that starting in 1974, when
the EPA first adopted motor vehicle emission regulations that prohibited defeat devices, the agency's
own definition of such a device applied to one that "[r]educes the effectiveness of the emission control
system under conditions which may reasonably be expected to be encountered in normal urban vehicle
operation and use." Motor Vehicle Certification Procedures, 39 Fed. Reg. 7545, 7549 (Feb. 27, 1974)
(emphasis added). It was not until 1992 when the agency eliminated the word "urban" from its definition
of a defeat device in its motor vehicle emissions regulations. See Control of Air Pollution from New
Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines, 57 Fed. Reg. 31,888, 31,894 (July 17, 1992) (defining
defeat device as one that "reduces the effectiveness of the emission control system under conditions
which may reasonably be expected to be encountered in normal vehicle operation and use").
218. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
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though, that regulators must be ever vigilant when relying on performance
standards, making sure they are monitoring not only if firms are complying but
also how.
2. Performance standards can sometimes increase, rather than decrease,
the cumbersomeness and complexity of environmental regulation. Regulators
face constant criticism for imposing burdensome, complex rules that span
volume after volume of the Code of Federal Regulations. The regulatory
history of diesel engine regulation reveals that performance standards are not
necessarily any panacea for seemingly out-of-control red tape. True, the EPA's
performance-based limit gave heavy-duty diesel engine manufacturers the
theoretical flexibility to choose how to reduce NOx emissions. But the agency
has also added requirement after requirement to its testing regimen over the
years, resulting in a highly prescriptive protocol for how manufacturers must
conduct required emissions testing. That protocol now demands that teams of
automotive engineers in each company work to understand and then apply
these prescriptive tests. Furthermore, as the diesel emission experience
indicates, even when manufacturers apparently think they have satisfied the
government's tests to the letter, the EPA still has the ability to threaten to deny
a certificate of conformity and file an enforcement action when it concludes
that the letter or even perhaps the spirit of the law has been violated. This result
seems far from the rose-colored regulatory simplicity that performance
standards are supposed to deliver.
Not only did the EPA's standards' impose burdensome costs and
complexities on industry, but also the EPA itself has hardly found them easy to
design. The EPA took decades to refine its testing protocols, and presumably
the tests will be refined still further for automobile emissions following the
Volkswagen scandal. These kinds of refinements inevitably depend on agency
experience observing how regulated firms comply with the law of the test. With
diesel emissions regulation, the EPA arguably acted more swiftly than it
otherwise would have been able to do. Its "regulation by litigation" approach in
the 1990s, taken in response to the actions of the heavy-duty diesel engine
manufacturers, presumably short-circuited some of the time it would have
taken to impose its current standards and extensive testing protocols, as under
the Clean Air Act it would have needed to provide manufacturers with longer
lead times to develop new engines.2 19
3. Despite their promise of flexibility, performance standards can still
sometimes constrain industry choice and opportunities for innovation.
Performance standards' theoretical advantage stems from the discretion they
can provide to regulated firms. But in practice, the amount of discretion that a
performance standard provides will vary significantly, depending on the
meaningful options the standard allows regulated firms to consider. Sometimes,
the only way to meet a performance standard is to adopt a single available
219. See Morriss et al., supra note 57.
Yale Journal on Regulation
means, making the real effects of performance standards indistinguishable from
a means standard.
In general, the more closely a performance standard's obligation mirrors
the policy objective the standard is supposed to serve, the more options a
regulated firm can consider.22 0 For example, the ultimate outcome most
environmental regulation seeks to serve is the protection of human health.
Consider how many options a regulated diesel engine manufacturer would have
if a hypothetical regulation sought to reduce the adverse health effects from
exposure to ground level ozone by imposing an obligation on firms to keep
from increasing by some specified amount the health risks from human
exposure to ambient levels of ozone. Under such an imaginary regulation, the
legal obligation would mirror the ultimate outcome, and manufacturers could
consider any number of options that might advance the policy objective. For
example, they could warn citizens to remain inside more on days with elevated
levels of smog; they could seek to reduce emissions from their factories; or
they could reduce emissions from their automobiles.
Furthermore, each of these major options would presumably contain
additional subsidiary options. Take the option of targeting automobile
emissions as an example. Emissions could be reduced by focusing either on
emissions of volatile organic compounds that evaporate from the engine or on
emissions of HC or NOx from the tailpipe. Within the option of tailpipe
emissions control, there are additional options, as discussed in Section II.B, of
adjusting the engine timing and fuel injection, installing after-treatment control
devices, or making changes to the content of the fuel. Now, compare the full set
of these options available in response to a hypothetical regulation that set the
mandatory objective equal to the ultimate outcome with the options available to
a manufacturer subject to a tailpipe performance-based emissions limit. Even
though the tailpipe limit is performance-based, it clearly affords the
manufacturer a narrower range of options than a performance standard that
mirrors the ultimate outcome.
The point is that not all performance standards result in equal degrees of
flexibility. Even among the same type of performance standards-say, a
tailpipe emissions limit-there can be different degrees of flexibility. In fact, as
the EPA's experience with regulating heavy-duty diesel engine emissions
testifies, a performance standard sometimes can be virtually indistinguishable
from a technology standard when a firm has only one option available to it for
meeting the performance mandate. After the EPA lowered its NOx limits by
about 90% in 2007, engine manufacturers were effectively compelled to adopt
after-treatment as their only feasible option for complying.
220. See Cary Coglianese & Lori Bennear, Flexible Environmental Regulation, in
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 582 (Sheldon Kamieniecki & Michael E. Kraft
eds., 2012).
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4. Basing a performance standard on a single goal can sometimes lead to
undesired outcomes with respect to other goals. As explained in Section I.B,
the chemistry of NOx and particulate formation in diesel engines presents
government regulators and engine manufacturers with an important tradeoff
when it comes to reducing the public health effects of diesel emissions:
increasing combustion temperatures to decrease particulate emissions serves to
increase NOx generation.
Tradeoffs like these are nothing if not a staple of policymaking, but their
implications for performance standards have yet to be adequately recognized in
the field of regulation. The paucity of attention to tradeoffs in the literature on
performance standards is surprising, and particularly worrisome. If government
adopts a standard for one goal but ignores other goals, the latter objectives may
eventually suffer as industry adapts by securing the mandatory goal at the
expense of other goals.
Fortunately, EPA officials recognized the bigger picture with respect to
air pollutants from diesel engines. If the EPA had only set a stringent
performance standard for NOx, industry's response would likely have been to
lower the temperature of combustion to reduce NOx generation, which would
have increased the amount of unburned fuel released as particulates. For this
reason, the EPA appropriately issued both particulates and NOx emissions
standards and consciously considered the implications of each standard for the
other. But this has not always been the case with performance standards.221
Scholars and policy advisors would do well to follow the EPA's example in
this respect and pay attention to the need to identify and address tradeoffs when
considering the use of performance standards.
5. Performance standards eliminate neither conflict nor litigation over
environmental policy. Although some observers have suggested that
performance-based regulation will reduce conflict and make environmental
policy more collaborative,22 the experience with the EPA's diesel emissions
regulations does not provide much reason to expect any substantial reduction in
adversarialism. Environmental groups, industry, and the EPA have repeatedly
resorted to litigation over diesel emissions regulation .223 Environmental groups
221. Federal regulation of child-resistant packaging and automobile airbags provide
two examples where tradeoffs were initially not reflected in applicable performance standards, with
unfortunate consequences. In the child-resistant packaging case, regulators initially required only that
packages be hard for children to open; only years later, after children had been poisoned due to packages
left opened by adult caregivers, did the standard come also to include the competing goal of ensuring
that packages could readily be opened by adults. Airbags initially were designed to protect individuals
the size of an average adult male, leading to serious injuries and fatalities to children and smaller adults
caused by the airbag deployment. Both of these examples are discussed in greater detail in Coglianese,
supra note 17.
222. See FIORINO, supra note 16, at 21.
223. Of course, the mere fact that litigation occurs does not necessarily mean that
beneficial forms of policy cooperation have broken down, especially since the litigation process over
environmental regulations is much less combative than it can be in other contexts. See Cary Coglianese,
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sued the EPA in 1984 seeking to compel the agency to issue NOx standards for
diesels. Industry then sued the EPA in 1989 in an effort to delay the imposition
of any new standards. Eventually, in 1998, the EPA sued the heavy-duty diesel
engine manufacturers for failing to comply faithfully with the emissions control
regime. Although the EPA's enforcement suit against the manufacturers was
eventually settled, the agency still later found that one of the companies
violated the settlement agreement and, in still another subsequent court action,
a court upheld a $72 million penalty against the recalcitrant firm. 22 4 When the
EPA engaged in rulemaking some years later to strengthen penalties for
noncompliance with its revised diesel emissions standards, industry
successfully sued the agency twice.225 Nearly twenty years after first taking an
enforcement action against manufacturers of diesel truck engines, the EPA
again pursued litigation over diesel engine emissions, this time against
Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche for similar alleged violations of the diesel
emissions standards for light-duty vehicles.226 As should be clear, performance-
based regulation neither harmonizes the different entities' stakes in the
regulatory regime nor diminishes individuals' desire to advance their interests.
It clearly does not eliminate conflict or litigation.
6. Without effective testing and monitoring, performance standards are
destined to fail. All regulation depends on effective oversight. But since
performance standards invite firms to make their own choices, effective testing
and monitoring assumes a special significance for this form of regulation.
Throughout the course of the EPA's history regulating diesel emissions, the
agency appropriately recognized not only the need to revise emissions
standards, but also to keep working to refine testing protocols. Initially, the
EPA's protocol called for just steady-state conditions, but over time, the testing
regimen grew in complexity as the agency adopted different versions of
transient tests (and has even incorporated some limited in-use testing). As
agency officials gained experience with how industry responded to their law of
the test, they learned that each preceding version of the agency's testing
protocol did not deliver enough confidence that regulatory objectives were
being satisfactorily measured and ultimately achieved in practice.
Although it may seem rather obvious that performance standards depend
inherently on the ability of regulators to measure and monitor firms'
performance,2 27 this case study of diesel engine emissions regulation shows all
Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory Process, 30 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 735 (1996).
224. See United States v. Volvo Powertrain Corp., 854 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.D.C. 2012).
225. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Daimler Trucks N.
Am. LLC v. EPA, 737 F.3d 95 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
226. See United States Files Complaint Against Volkswagen, Audi, and Porsche for
Alleged Clean Air Act Violations, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4379a92ceceeac85257359004nc27/ac7b52362207dad7852
57f300060442e!OpenDocument.
227. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 32, at 704.
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too well how difficult, if not nearly impossible, it can be for regulators to obtain
accurate, relevant information on regulated firms' performance. The EPA's
tragic failure to detect Volkswagen's noncompliance twenty years after its
experience with diesel truck engine manufacturers only drives this point home.
Regulators must remain cognizant that performance on the test very well may
not equate to performance in action, especially when regulators test
performance in artificial settings, such as a laboratory.
7. Even when performance standards are implemented fully, and even
when firms faithfully comply with them, policy success may still remain elusive.
Performance standards are usually based on an output or outcome that is
thought to be a precursor to, or perhaps a proxy for, the ultimate outcome of
concern underlying the standards. For that reason, these standards can fail, even
when firms fully comply with their letter and spirit, if the link between the
outcome specified in a standard and the ultimate outcome of concern prove to
be faulty, outdated, or incomplete. Other factors-natural or human-may well
contribute to the underlying problem, and these factors may remain completely
unchanged by the regulation. The regulation's design may either fail to target
the root cause of the problem or may fail to foreclose other causal pathways
that lead to that problem.
The EPA's experience with the control of heavy-duty diesel engine
emissions helps illustrate this possibility. As noted in Section III.D, one
consequence of the EPA's more stringent emissions standards was to expand
the market for older engines. When the new standards were announced, orders
for current models increased. Customers, whose behavior the EPA did not
regulate, were concerned not only about the increased cost of engines that
would meet the new standards, but also about the engines' performance and
reliability. The market for used vehicles also expanded, and fleet owners
maintained older vehicles longer. At least in the short term, the EPA's new
standards and testing protocol may very well have increased NOx emissions
somewhat, rather than have decreased them.228
Even if the EPA's more stringent standard ultimately decreases levels of
NOx over time, it is still possible that the standard may fail to achieve the
reductions in ground-level ozone that the EPA intends it to reach. NOx is a
precursor to ozone, which is formed through a photochemical reaction, but it is
well-known that ozone "does not necessarily respond in a proportional manner
to reductions in the precursor emissions.' '229 The relationship between NOx and
ozone is not a linear one; it depends on other factors such as the level of
volatile organic compounds in the atmosphere. Some observers have speculated
that reducing NOx without making comparable reductions in volatile organic
228. See Morriss et al., supra note 57, at 502 ("If enough engines were added through
pre-buys or older engines were continued past their useful lives in the absence of the consent decrees,
the net effect on air pollution might be an increase rather than a decrease for a period of time.").
229. BARBARA J. FINLAYSON-PIT-S & JAMES N. Purrs, CHEMISTRY OF THE UPPER
AND LOWER ATMOSPHERE: THEORY, EXPERIMENTS, AND APPLICATIONS 871 (2000).
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compounds can actually blunt the rate of reduction in ozone, perhaps "even
making ozone worse in some cities. 2 30 The mere possibility of such an
outcome, however speculative, suggests that performance standards, like any
regulation, can fail to work as anticipated, suffering flaws in design even when
achieving full compliance.
B. Comparing to Means Standards
Even though we have just presented a litany of limitations to performance
standards, we do not intend to claim that performance standards are
distinctively problematic or should never be used. On the contrary, some of the
same challenges that performance standards present, like those the EPA
encountered in implementing its diesel emissions rules, can also arise with
means standards. Means standards, for example, can and do generate conflict
and litigation; they can and do produce red tape; and obviously they can and do
inhibit flexibility and innovation. Means standards can also run afoul of
tradeoffs, side effects, and unintended consequences. If the EPA had mandated
a certain type of combustion control technology to reduce just NOx emissions,
for example, it would have still run the risk of increasing particulates.
But it is also possible that means standards can reduce or even avoid some
of the problems encountered with performance standards. Had the EPA
eschewed a performance-based approach and instead imposed technology
requirements, such as by requiring a specific kind of after-treatment, it might
have made faster, more certain progress, without the setbacks and delays that
resulted from industry's efforts to take advantage of the flexibility afforded by
a law-of-the-test approach. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to surmise that
when agencies mandate that firms adopt a technology based on experience
demonstrating that it works, the process of discovering what technology to
require and validating that it does truly work (especially if that validation
involves in-use testing) will likely reveal potential problems that might
otherwise not have occurred to the regulator. Of course, if any mandated
technology itself is tested or validated only in a limited or narrow manner, the
risk of overlooking tradeoffs or other problems could be the same under either
a performance-based or means-based approach. Yet it is certainly hard to
imagine the EPA ever mandating engine controllers that met the desired NOx
levels only during the period of laboratory testing but that subsequently
adjusted automatically to maximize fuel economy and performance instead of
NOx control. Means standards inherently reduce the possibility of dynamic
adaptation by industry, virtually eliminating problems like teaching to the test.
230. Joel Schwartz, EPA Rule Is Making Ozone Smog Worse: 'Weekend Effect' Makes
Costly Measures Backfire, ENV'T & CLIMATE NEWS 12 (May 2006).
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Conclusion
Performance standards are clearly not a cure-all. Their success ultimately
depends on a regulator's ability to specify performance and then to measure
and monitor it accurately, conditions that will not always be met. Obviously, as
with any kind of regulation, when performance standards are poorly designed
or used under unsuitable conditions, they can prove ineffectual or even
counterproductive. Moreover, the flexibility built into performance standards
can create its own special kinds of worries, like the teaching-to-the-test
phenomenon.
In the end, the choice about whether and how to use performance
standards will depend on the underlying circumstances, as well as how
performance standards stack up against alternative regulatory approaches in
those circumstances. Although performance standards are sometimes assumed
to be "generally superior" to other approaches, the reality is more complex than
previously acknowledged. For any given problem, regulators must determine
whether the limitations of performance standards are more severe than the
limitations of other types of standards.
Our explication of problems associated with the EPA's diesel emissions
performance standards, and our acknowledgement of possible relative virtues
of means standards, is not intended to imply that government should never
issue performance standards. To the contrary, there remain sound reasons for
preferring performance standards in certain instances. The targets of
regulation-in particular, large industrial firms-usually have better
information than government about their operations and about how to correct
the complex public problems created by their market activity.23 1 Consequently,
the flexibility that performance standards afford can sometimes make sense.
These standards can be socially beneficial if they afford businesses the
opportunity to innovate and find less costly means of achieving desired social
objectives. The persistent challenge for government, though, is to make sure
that any innovation does not compromise the public welfare goals underlying
the standards. When diesel engine manufacturers developed electronic injection
control techniques that would meet the EPA's tests while also better meeting
consumer demand, that innovation occurred principally to satisfy consumer
preferences, not to advance the regulator's larger public goal of pollution
reduction. In a market economy, such behavior is to be expected and perhaps
even applauded. However, when performance standards are imposed on private
actors to achieve legitimate social goals, the very predictability of private
adaptive behavior, combined with performance standards' flexibility, provides
a special reason for ongoing governmental vigilance.
231. See Cary Coglianese, Business Interests and Information in Environmental
Rulemaking, in BUSINESS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 185 (Michael Kraft & Sheldon Kamieniecki
eds., 2007).
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In short, when the law amounts to a test, that test must be both well
proctored and subject to ongoing review and modification in the face of
changing conditions, including adaptive industry behavior. Success is not
preordained merely because of performance standards' widely extolled
theoretical advantages. Rather, success depends on regulatory officials' analytic
capacity to map the often complex and dynamic causal pathways that lead to a
regulatory problem. It also depends on the regulator's ongoing monitoring of
firms' adaptive behavior and how that behavior might affect different pathways
leading to the underlying problem. In its demand for accurate information and
sound analysis, then, performance-based regulation is neither generally superior
nor generally inferior to any other form of regulation.232 Successfully designing
and implementing performance-based regulation can be just as challenging as it
is for any kind of regulation. Under some circumstances, it might be more
challenging still.
232. See Cary Coglianese et al., supra note 25.
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